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ABSTRACT
The present thesis contributes to the theoretical analysis of the human capital
investment and participation decision of heterogeneous workers in the search and
matching framework. Its aim is to characterise the equilibrium and to identify the
eﬃciency. The first chapter of this thesis contributes to study equilibrium search
and matching to consider the participation decision of heterogeneous workers who
have diﬀerent inherent ability level. The productivity investment decision is en-
dogenous and wages are determined by the Nash bargain among participants. In
steady-state equilibrium investment decision reveals the hold-up problem. Given
overall labor market condition, equilibrium is determined by free entry condition,
optimal productivity investment decision, the participation constraint plus the
steady state conditions. In this model I also show that heterogeneity is not the
cause of multiplicity. The second chapter utilises the previous analysis to identify
those government policies that can achieve eﬃciency in an economy. I show that
the number of labor market participants and job creation and productivity invest-
ment are ineﬃcient owing to externalities resulting from participation decision,
productivity investment and market tightness condition. Therefore, in my first
best policy scenario, I find the government should subsidise training, tax labour
market participation and subsidise job creation. The last chapter considers an
4
integrated framework where social security benefits are chosen to induce optimal
search by unemployed workers given the income tax structure imposed by the gov-
ernment. As tax policy distorts the willingness of workers to find employment,
it provides a simple rule which identifies the link between optimal social security
benefits paid and the tax system. Specifically in the case of a universal, linear
income tax scheme, optimal social security benefits should be paid at a flat rate;
i.e. all receive the same benefit level regardless of earnings which is the main
contribution of the paper.
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Chapter 1
Productivity Investment and Labor Force
Participation in Search Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I construct a theoretical model that focuses on the role of productiv-
ity investment incentives in the standard search and matching model. The model
follows directly from insights presented by Lockwood (1986) and is an extension of
the basic matching model developed by Pissarides (1990) where individuals need
to invest in their productivity before participating in the labor market.
Many economists view the skills of the labor force as a prime contributor to
economic performance. Therefore, not surprisingly policy makers are often inter-
ested in issues of worker training. For instance, training of less skilled workers was
one of the principle policy initiatives of the first Clinton administration and the
labour government in Britain has similarly made training a key policy issue.
A number of OECD countries have experienced increased returns in skills in-
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vestment over the last years. Many policy makers believe that low educated work-
ers can also benefit from the changes in the demand for skills if they invest more
in their education. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), not only pointed out the importance
of market demand , but also of skills, and noted that training of workers was a
prerequisite for industrialisation, though unlikely to happen.
While it is important to understand the optimisation problem of human capital
investment of an agent, it is necessary to pay attention to its subsequent interaction
with labor market. Beside considering heterogeneity of workers and human capital
investment and the cost related to this investment, we must also analyse how the
resulting change in the supply of heterogeneous workers aﬀects the labour market
equilibrium. The interdependence becomes more complicated when we recognise
there is friction in the labour market. We live in a world where information
is imperfect and costly. Individual decision-making at entry (or exit) point of
the market, the choice of lowest acceptable productivity and the choice of search
intensity margins may be socially ineﬃcient. What is common in all these margins,
as Pissarides (1983) makes clear, is that they are all due external factors that work
through the matching technology. When individuals choose to enter a market,
accept a match or search more intensively they ignore the impact of their decisions
on the matching probabilities of other agents in the market. Lockwood (1986)
assumes heterogeneous workers in their inherent skills to show the other external
eﬀect that work through match acceptance probabilities rather than matching
probabilities. In particular, he shows that the presence of high-skill workers lowers
the equilibrium acceptance probabilities of low skill workers below what is socially
desirable.
An aggregate increase in return to education is a standard property of match-
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ing models. With human capital investment, a more productive workforce raises
the labour demand. However a tighter labour market increases the incentives to
schooling. This mechanism can give rise to multiple equilibria (see e.g. Laing et
al.,1995; Burdett and Smith (2002)). They argue that if workers’ decision to invest
in education and firms’ job creation decisions interact positively, then the econ-
omy can get stuck in a bad equilibrium. As a result the human capital investment
will be insuﬃcient and also unemployment will be high. On the other hand Ace-
moglu (1996), argue that frictional unemployment can create a hold up problem
whereby workers are generally paid a share less than their marginal productivity.
Charlot et al.(2005) show that equilibrium is unique in their framework since the
productivity eﬀect of schooling dominates the wage eﬀect. Clearly the presence
of matching unemployment is a common explanation of weakness of incentives for
education investment.
Since Becker (1964), provided the labour market is perfectly competitive, the
market outcome is socially optimal. However, in the presence of unemployment,
models analysing matching models with ex post Nash bargaining and ex ante
costly human capital investment Laing et al.(1995) and Acemoglu (1996), workers
under-invest in education which is the result of hold up phenomenon. Clearly
search frictions play an important role in that. Though Cole et al.(2001) show
that in the frictionless environment with two sided investment there can also be
over investment.
My argument is based on workers’ heterogeneity and self selection in education.
The introduction of heterogeneity makes the model more realistic and in addition
allows one to gain insights into the worker behaviour that do not follow from models
of homogeneous labor market. When workers diﬀer according to the ability level
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and the cost of productivity level that he or she is going to attain, the worker must
decide to invest in his/her productivity and then participate in the labor market.
This is an integral part of participation decision.
It is well established in the literature that a core topic in labor economics
is ‘self-selection’. The starting point of this topic in economics is Roy’s (1951)
“Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings”. Self-selection means in theory, that
rational individuals make optimising decisions about what markets to participate
in- job, education, crime, etc. In the present paper heterogeneity of the labor force
in their abilities and education cost give rise to self-selection. Where the cost of
productivity investment is not constant and it depends on ability of the worker
and also the amount of investment on productivity.
Alternative specifications of the matching process have been considered in the
literature: search may be undirected (see, eg. Acemoglu, 1999 ; Albercht and
Vroman, 2002) or skilled workers may poach on unskilled jobs (see, e.g. Gau-
tier, 2002). Charlot and Decreuse (2005), consider two separate matching sectors
where educated workers direct their search towards high productivity occupations.
Adopting those diﬀerent specifications would, of course, alter our results.
My argument also is related to intra/infra marginal decision. And individ-
ual decisions are characterised into two classes: intramarginal decision of resource
allocation and inframarginal decision of economic organisation. Intramarginal de-
cisions involve the extent to which resources are allocated and inframarginal deci-
sions are about what activities to engage. Considering the two types of decisions,
I analyse a theoretical model that focuses on equilibrium incentives for produc-
tivity investment in matching framework with one-sided heterogeneity. There are
two risk neutral groups: workers and employers. There are two types of workers;
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low ability and high ability workers while employers are identical. Distribution of
abilities is exogenous.
This paper argues human capital investment decision of heterogeneous workers
in equilibrium search framework. I further demonstrate how it can be used to
illustrate eﬃciency in the next chapter. The technology that I assume is such that
workers invest on their education to achieve productivity and then search for a job.
Of course education is costly, those who invest in education and search for job are
participant in the labor market. In this paper, the choice of investment in human
capital is intramarginal decision since it involves deciding the quantity of resources
devoted to acquire human capital. Once he/she has chosen his investment decision
in human capital, he then searches for the job.
The standard search model features exogenous labor supply-i.e., a fixed size
of the labor force. Rather than consider flows between search unemployment and
employment of a fixed labor force, I examine the participation decisions of worker.
If labor force participation is fully endogenous, just as is labor demand in the form
of vacancy creation, then another condition which I name it labor force participa-
tion constraint impinges the basic framework equations. Therefore workers reach
diﬀerent participation decisions on the basis of comparison between labor market
and non market returns. Here I consider a labor force participation decision, a
margin which is absent in most of models of labor market. This paper exploits the
basic insights of above models; i.e. self selection at the individual level alters the
equilibrium composition of groups. My contribution to this literature is then to
highlight the equilibrium characteristics of heterogeneous workers with endogenous
productivity investment and free entry of firms which drives job creation.
I use a matching process in the spirit of Pissarides (1990) with a Nash bargain-
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ing approach to wage-setting. Given overall labor market condition, equilibrium is
determined by free entry condition, optimal productivity investment decision, the
participation constraint plus the steady state conditions. Equilibrium can take one
of the following forms. The first type of equilibrium is one in which it is beneficial
for both types of workers to be active in the labor market. In the second type
of equilibrium, there is only the willingness of high ability workers to invest in
their productivities and search for job. Third, for small changes in the economic
environment multiple equilibria can exist. Finally I show that heterogeneity is not
the cause of multiplicity in this model.
I now turn in the next section to the presentation of my model. This is fol-
lowed, in Section 3, by an analysis of reduce form free entry condition and the
equilibrium’s definition and existence. In section 4, I extend the model to the two
types case of the workers and illustrate the equilibrium. Finally, in section 5, I
summarise my results and conclude.
1.2 The Model
The model is an extension of the Lockwood (1986), Pissarides (2000) matching
framework. The economy is composed of two risk-neutral groups: workers and
firms. All firms are identical whose number is endogenously determined by a stan-
dard free entry condition but workers diﬀer in their abilities. This heterogeneity
in ability implies diﬀerent workers invest in diﬀerent productivity levels.
Throughout time is continuous and I shall only consider steady states. There is
turnover - all workers die according to a Poisson process with parameter φ > 0. φ
also describe the inflow of new workers into the economy and so ensures the steady
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state number of workers is one. Workers diﬀer in their inherent ability level: when
first entering the economy, each is endowed with an ability a which is considered
as a random draw from the population distribution G(·). Assume G is continuous
(no mass points) and has support [0, a]. Given ability a, a worker initially chooses
an education, or productivity level, x ≥ 0. I then let F (x) describe the steady
state distribution of productivity levels among all active unemployed workers who
enter the labour market and seek employment. Of course F (·) is endogenously
determined by equilibrium behaviour.
The model has a standard hold-up structure: given beliefs on market wages,
an individual who is born with ability a first selects a productivity level x. The
cost of obtaining that productivity level depends on ability a. After investing in
her productivity, she then enter the labour market and search for a job. If she
does so and contacts a firm, her wage is then determined by Nash bargaining.
Of course expectations are rational: the negotiated wage is consistent with her
original beliefs. As firms are identical, w = w∗(x) will denote the equilibrium
negotiated wage.
At any moment in time a worker is either non-participant, employed or unem-
ployed. A non-participant(inactive) realises there is no gain to trade with any firm.
An employed worker with productivity level x produces output with flow value x.
An unemployed worker enjoys flow income b > 0 while unemployed, where b is
independent of a and x.
There are matching frictions - it takes time for unemployed workers to find
vacancies. Assume a worker contacts a vacancy according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate m(θ). Similarly let m(θ)θ denote the rate at which a vacancy
contacts an unemployed. Search is random in that given a contact, the worker’s
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productivity x is considered by the firm as a random draw from F (.).
Let U denote the measure of active unemployed workers who participate in
the labor market and V denote the measure of vacancies. Let M(U, V ) denote
the matching function which describes the flow number of contacts between active
unemployed workers and vacancies over time. Assume M is increasing in both
arguments, concave and has constant returns. By defining market tightness θ = VU
and m(θ) = M(1, θ), then symmetry implies
M(U, V )
U
= M(1, θ) ≡ m(θ)
M(U, V )
V
=
U
V
M(1,
V
U
) ≡ m(θ)
θ
.
Note that by assumption on M , m(θ) is increasing in θ and m(θ)θ is decreasing in
θ. For simplicity assume there is no on-the-job search. There are job destruction
shocks: each match is destroyed at exogenous rate δ after which the laid-oﬀ worker
becomes active unemployed. As it is standard in the Pissarides (2000) framework,
equilibrium market tightness is determined by a free entry condition. All choose
strategies to maximise expected lifetime payoﬀ.
1.2.1 Worker’s Payoﬀs and Job Search Strategies
Before describing optimal productivity choice, I first describe the expected lifetime
value of being unemployed with productivity x in a market with tightness θ, which
I denote VU(x, θ). Below Nash bargaining will yield a negotiated wage outcome
which I denote w = wN(x, θ). Standard turnover arguments imply the value of
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being an active worker with productivity x satisfies
(r + φ)VU(x, θ) = b+m(θ)[VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)] (1.1)
where VE(x, θ) describes the value of being employed with productivity x and
tightness θ is given by
(r + φ)VE(x, θ) = w
N(x, θ) + δ[VU(x, θ)− VE(x, θ)], (1.2)
an active job seeker enjoys flow payoﬀ b and finds employment at rate m(θ) with
associated gain VE(x, θ) − VU(x, θ). While employed, the worker negotiates wage
w = wN(x, θ) as determined below. At rate δ the job is exogenously destroyed
and the worker returns to the pool of unemployed workers. Substituting out VE(.),
these equations imply:
VU(x, θ) =
(r + φ+ δ)b+m(θ)wN(x, θ)
(r + φ)(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)
(1.3)
Clearly, the worker with productivity x will only enter the labour market if and
only if VE(x, θ) ≥ VU(x, θ). As education is costly, those who choose not to enter
the labour market, the non-participants, will choose x = 0.
1.2.2 Firm’s Payoﬀs and Optimal Strategies
This section characterises firm’s behaviour for the given market tightness. As
all firms are identical, if an active unemployed job seeker is acceptable to one
employer, he or she is acceptable to all employers. For an active job seeker with
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ability ai, let x∗(θ) denote her/his optimal productivity investment. Standard
argument implies:
rJV (θ) = −k + m(θ)
θ
￿ x
x
max[JF (x
∗(θ))− JV (θ), 0]dF (x). (1.4)
Posting a vacancy induces a flow cost k > 0. With m(θ)θ a firm holding a vacancy
contacts an active job seeker. An employer’s expected discounted return when
employing an active unemployed worker with productivity x(θ) is
rJF (x, θ) = x− w(x, θ) + (δ + φ)[JV (θ)− JF (x, θ)] (1.5)
The revenue to the firm associated with the filled job is equal to x − w(x, θ).
Accordingly,
JF (x, θ) =
x− w(x, θ) + (δ + φ)JV (θ)
(r + δ + φ)
. (1.6)
Clearly, the return of vacancy to an employer depends on the output of the match
which entirely determined by the productivity of the worker minus the wage. Free
entry requires that new vacancies are created until the capital of holding one is
driven to zero, i.e., JV = 0. So,
JF (x) =
x− w(x, θ)
(r + δ + φ)
. (1.7)
Employers by using a “reservation x strategy”, hire any worker such that JF (x) ￿
JV . Lets define xR where JF (x) = JV so, there exist a level of reservation produc-
tivity, xR, which is equal to unemployment income, xR = b. Returning to equation
(1.4) and imposing free entry condition and reservation productivity strategy, cost
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of posting vacancy can be expressed as
k =
m(θ)
θ
￿ x¯
b
x− w(x, θ)
r + φ+ δ
dF (x) (1.8)
Equation (1.8) denotes the free entry equilibrium condition which is one of the key
equation of the equilibrium model.
1.2.3 Wage Determination
Clearly any match between active unemployed worker and firm is consummated
whenever the joint surplus is positive. The joint surplus between a worker with
productivity x and a firm, given θ is written as
S(x) = [JF (x, θ)− JV (θ)] + [VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)]
Following Diamond and Pissarides, we suppose that the total surplus from the
match is divided up according to a generalised Nash bargain, so that the worker
receives β ∈ (0, 1) percent of the surplus.1 2 Then the wage is implicitly deter-
mined by
βS(x, θ) = VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)
(1− β)S(x, θ) = JF (x, θ)− JV (θ)
1Nash showed that the unique outcome which is consistent with his axioms has worker’s
bargaining power equal to 12 . The solution generalised Nash is β ∈ (0, 1) by relaxing his symmetry
axiom.
2For the case that β = 0, workers do not get return from their investment in productivity and
clearly no one would acquire productivity. When β = 1, firms will not post any vacancy and the
return to productivity would be zero. I do not take into account those cases.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining power which is exogenous. By substi-
tuting out VE(x, θ)−VU(x, θ) and JF (x, θ)−JV (θ) from (1.3), (1.2) and (1.7) into
above equations, and by imposing the free entry condition JV (θ) = 0, I obtain the
equilibrium wage:
wN(x) =
β(r + φ+m(θ)x+ δ) + (r + φ+ δ)(1− β)b
(βm(θ) + r + φ+ δ)
. (1.9)
The slope of wage equation is positive and less than one which implies that an
employer makes more profit the greater the productivity level of the worker it
hires.
1.2.4 Productivity Investment Decision
In this section the equilibrium market outcome is taken as given. Specifically
as each worker is small, he/she takes the market tightness parameter θ as given.
Also he/she anticipates the equilibrium wage that is negotiated by a worker of
productivity x. Below this is denoted w = wN(x, θ). Thus given innate ability
a market tightness θ and wage function wN(x, θ), the worker first chooses the
optimal level of productivity x to maximise the expected value of lifetime utility.
Let C(x; a) denote the cost of investing to productivity x given initial ability
a. Assume C(.) is strictly increasing, convex and twice diﬀerentiable in x. Also
C(a; a) = 0, C(.) is decreasing in a (it is less costly for a higher ability to achieve
a given productivity level) and Cxa < 0 so that higher ability types face a lower
marginal cost to achieving a higher productivity level x. For ease of exposition
assume the Inada condition Cx(a, a) = 0.
Optimal productivity of worker, denoted x∗ ≡ x∗(a, θ) conditional on being active
21
is then given by;
x∗(a, θ) = argmax
x≥a
[VU(x, θ)− C(x; a)] (1.10)
The RHS is the sum of value of being active unemployed minus the direct cost
of investment in the productivity. The Inada condition ensures the necessary
condition for optimal x∗ is given by;
∂VU(x∗, θ)
∂x
=
∂C(x∗; a)
∂x
(1.11)
Of course this condition describes the optimal investment choice for active workers
- those who will choose to enter the labour market and search for employment.
Not all workers, however, will choose to be active. In equilibrium, there is a critical
ability ac where those with ability a < ac will choose not to be active. Specifi-
cally by staying out of the labour market, each worker can always generate payoﬀ
b/(r + φ).
Thus only workers whose participation in the labour market exceeds b/(r+φ) will
be active labour market members. I therefore formally define ac as follows.
DEFINITION of ac(θ):
VU(x
∗, θ)− C(x∗, ac) = b
r + φ
(Active Constraint) (1.12)
where x∗ = x∗(ac, θ) is the optimal productivity choice of an active participant
with ability a = ac. Note that ac depends on market tightness θ - below we shall
show that ac is decreasing in θ; i.e. higher market tightness leads to more workers
choosing to become active. Claim 1 now establishes that a worker with ability a
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is active in the labour market if and only if a ≥ ac(θ).
CLAIM 1. For any θ:
(I) Individuals with a ≥ ac(θ) are active, and choose x = x∗(a, θ).
(II) Individuals with a < ac(θ) are inactive, choose x = a at zero cost and enjoy
b
r+φ .
Proof. As an active worker of ability a solves the program
max
x≥a
[VU(x, θ)− C(x; a)],
the Envelope theorem implies this payoﬀ is strictly increasing in a. As worker
a = ac is indiﬀerent to participating, then all those with a > ac strictly prefer to
participate (and invest to x∗(a, θ) while all those with a < ac(θ) strictly prefer
not to participate (and so choose x = a) and hence for these workers there is no
return to education, and so these discouraged workers would drop out of the labor
market process. ￿
It is straightforward that the optimal level of productivity x∗(a) in (1.11) sat-
isfies
∂C(x∗, a)
∂x
=
m(θ)β
(r + φ)(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
(1.13)
The marginal productivity cost with diﬀerent ability level is shown in Figure
(1.1) where a2 > a1. There is marginal cost function for each level of ability.
For the larger ability level the marginal cost curve will shift down. Consequently,
for the given optimal productivity, for instance x∗, the marginal cost function for
the worker with lower ability is higher than the worker with higher ability. This
implies that the one with bigger a select higher productivity. It is not rational for
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Figure 1.1: Marginal Productivity Cost
the worker with the very low level of ability to invest in her productivity, so she
does not select productivity.
1.2.5 The Reduced Form Free Entry Condition
The following claim and proposition help us to identify a solution to the free entry
condition.
PROPOSITION 1. ac(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ.
Proof: The above has established that for any active worker:
VU(x, θ) =
(r + φ+ δ)b+m(θ)wN(x, θ)
(r + φ)(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)
with
wN(x, θ) =
β(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)x+ (1− β)(r + φ+ δ)b
(βm(θ) + r + φ+ δ)
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Clearly VU is increasing in x. Some algebra also establishes that VU is increasing
and continuously diﬀerentiable with θ. Now ac is defined by
VU(x
∗, θ)− C(x∗, ac) = b
r + φ
(ActiveConstraint) (1.14)
with x∗ = x∗(ac, θ) given by
∂VU(x∗, θ)
∂x
=
∂C(x∗; ac)
∂x
. (1.15)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (1.14) w.r.t θ and using (1.15) implies:
dac
dθ
=
∂VU
∂θ
∂C
∂ac
< 0
as required. ￿
CLAIM 2. The Nash wage wN(x, θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ.
Proof. Trivial by diﬀerentiating the above solution for wN(.) w.r.t θ. We now
identify a solution to the free entry condition. Substituting out wN(.) in the
equation for VU(.) yields
VU(x, θ) =
b(r + φ+ δ) +m(θ)βx
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
. (1.16)
As VU is linear in x while C(.) is convex, then for a ≥ ac, the first order condition
for x∗(a, θ):
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C(x∗; a)
∂x
(1.17)
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Figure 1.2: Critical Ability and Market Tightness
describes a global maximum. Note further for a > ac this equation implies x∗(a, θ)
is a continuous and strictly increasing function of a and θ. ￿
Also inserting the expression for w = wN(x, θ) into equation (1.7) gives:
JF (x, θ) =
(r + φ+ δ)(x− b)
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
. (1.18)
Thus the free entry equation which specifies market tightness is defined by insert-
ing the wage equation into the JF and then substitute it out and rearranging the
terms. The next step is to show that for a > ac, that x∗(a, θ) is a continuous and
increasing function of θ.
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CLAIM 3: x∗(a, θ) is a continuous and increasing function of θ and is strictly
increasing in a
Proof. For types a > ac who are active, their optimal investment choice x∗(.) is
given by the first order condition:
∂VU(x∗, θ)
∂x
=
∂C(x∗; a)
∂x
.
Equation(1.17) implies
∂VU(x, θ)
∂x
=
βm(θ)
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
(1.19)
and so ∂VU/∂x is a continuous, increasing function of θ. As C(.) is twice diﬀer-
entiable and strictly convex in x, the implicit function theorem implies x∗ is a
continuous increasing function of θ. Also as Cxa < 0 by assumption, then x∗ must
strictly increase in ability. ￿
Claim 3 establishes that investment by active workers increases as market tight-
ness increases, and does so continuously. Furthermore, comparing workers who
are active, higher ability types invest to a strictly higher productivity level.
Given F (x(a)) = G(a)−G(a
c)
1−G(ac) where
 a = a
c, F (x(a)) = 0
a = a, F (x(a)) = 1
and identifying a market equilibrium reduces to finding a θ which solves the equa-
tion.
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Now, it is apparent that equation (1.8) can be written as
k =
m(θ)
θ
(1− β)
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
￿ a¯
b
(x∗(a; θ)− b) dG(a)
1−G(ac) (1.20)
where x∗(a; θ) is the optimal productivity choice of ability a worker with market
tightness θ. Throughout the rest of this part Φ(θ) corresponds to the right hand
side of (1.20).
1.2.6 Steady State Turnover
The steady state number of active unemployed workers, U , is the diﬀerence be-
tween the flow of workers who transits from employment to unemployment and
the flow that transits in the opposite direction. First, let us determine the steady
state number of unemployed workers, given ac. All those with ability less than
ac are never employed. Hence, G(ac) are never employed. Hence, G(ac) are non
participant (inactive unemployed). Those with ability at least as great as ac are
sometimes unemployed (maybe active in the labor market). U then is the number
of workers with ability at least as great as ac who are unemployed in a steady
state. To determine U note
(φ+m(θ))U = δ(1−G(ac)− U) + φ(1−G(ac)) (1.21)
so,
U =
(δ + φ)(1−G(ac))
φ+ δ +m(θ)
. (1.22)
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1.3 Decentralised Equilibrium
1.3.1 Definition
A market equilibrium is defined as follows:
ME1: worker participate in the labor market if and only if a ≥ ac where:
VU(x
∗(ac, θ), θ)− C(x∗(ac, θ), ac) = b
r + φ
(1.23)
ME2: active participants choose optimal productivity choice x∗ where:
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C
∂x
(x∗(a, θ), a) (1.24)
ME3: free entry condition:
k =
m(θ)
θ
(1− β)
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
￿ a¯
b
(x∗(a; θ)− b) dG(a)
1−G(ac) (1.25)
1.3.2 Existence and Characterisation
CLAIM 4. It follows that a market equilibrium defined by a triple equations
(1.23), (1.24) and (1.25) exists if k < Φ(θ).3
3I assume that m(θ) and m(θ)θ satisfy the standard properties:
i) m(θ) is increasing in θ,
ii) m(θ)θ is decreasing in θ,
iii) limθ→0 m(θ) = 0 and limθ→∞m(θ)→∞
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Figure 1.3: Existence of Equilibrium
Proof.
Case I: θ → 0
In this case, m(θ)→ 0 which means it is impossible for the workers to get job and
hence nobody will be in the market as ac → ∞. The cost of posting vacancy is
zero. Clearly the right hand side of (1.25) will be higher than the left hand side,
i.e. br+φ =
b
r+φ − C(x; a)
Case II: θ is finite
Consider θ = θ subject to ac(θ) = a. At θ = θ, Φ(θ) will be equal to
Φ(θ) =
m(θ)
θ
(1− β)
r + δ +m(θ)
[x∗(a; θ)− b)]
Now suppose θ < θ, then ac > a and therefore no one choose investment in
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productivity.
Case III: θ →∞
Suppose that θ approaches infinite, then the m(θ)→∞ which implies ac → ac.
As θ →∞, x∗(a; θ) is given by
1
r + φ
= Cx(x
∗; a)
by substituting x∗ into (1.23) we have
b
r + φ
=
w(x∗(ac,∞))
r
− C(x∗(ac,∞); ac)
it is obvious the result is just a finite number. Finally by plugging θ →∞ into Φ(θ)
it shows Φ(θ)→ 0. Given k > 0, then by the intermediate-value and Fixed point
theorem, there must exist a value θ∗ ∈ [θ,+∞), equilibrium exist if k < Φ(θ), (see
Figure 1.3). ￿
For the unique solution of θ, Φ(θ) should be monotonically decreasing in θ, which
I cannot prove analytically. However to bring out the equilibrium issue clearly I
show the model for the two types of workers in the next section.
1.4 Two Types Case
Now suppose there are two types of entrants, where i ∈ l, h denote a worker’s
type. Those with low-ability, al and those with high-ability, ah where ah > al >
0. Assuming fraction ηi of entrants are type i, the distribution of ability across
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entrants, denoted G(a) is

G(a) = 0 for a < al
G(a) = ηl for al ≤ a < ah
G(a) = 1 for a ≥ ah.
In steady state, let 1−π denote the proportion of active agents who are high ability
(π will be endogenously determined and depending on the investment choice of
workers).
Ei denotes the number of employed workers with ability ai. Let U = UAl +U
A
h
the number of active unemployed job seekers. Random search implies (1− π)m(θ)θ
is the rate at which a firm contacts an active job seeker with high ability.
1.4.1 Determining VU(x, θ)
Again, the first step is to write the value of unemployment and the value of vacancy.
In this case, I proceed by writing the return to be active unemployment explicitly:
VU(x, θ) =
(r + φ+ δ)b+m(θ)wN(x, θ)
(r + φ)(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)
. (1.26)
The arguments behind the definition of critical ability, ac and optimal productivity
investment are unchanged. Optimal productivity of type i worker, denoted x∗ ≡
x∗(ai, θ) conditional on being active is then given by;
x∗(ai, θ) = argmax
x≥ai
[VU(x, θ)− C(x; ai)] (1.27)
and the necessary condition for optimal x∗i is given by;
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∂VU(x∗i , θ)
∂x
=
∂C(x∗i ; a)
∂x
(1.28)
The active constraint is given by
VU(x
∗
i , θ)− C(x∗i , ac) =
b
r + φ
(Active Constraint) (1.29)
where x∗i = x
∗(aci , θ) is the optimal productivity choice of an active participant
with ability a = ac. Note that ac depends on market tightness θ - it is decreasing
in θ; i.e. higher market tightness leads to more (low ability) workers choosing to
become active. Claim 4 now establishes that a worker with ability ai is active in
the labour market if and only if ai ≥ ac(θ).
CLAIM 5. For any θ:
(I) Individuals with ai ≥ ac(θ) are active, and choose x = x∗(a, θ).
(II) Individuals with ai < ac(θ) are inactive, choose x = ai at zero cost and enjoy
b
r+φ .
Proof. As an active worker of ability ai solves the program
max
x≥a
[VU(x, θ)− C(x; a)],
the Envelope theorem implies this payoﬀ is strictly increasing in ai. As worker
a = ac is indiﬀerent to participating, then all those with ai > ac strictly prefer to
participate (and invest to x∗(ai, θ) while all those with ai < ac(θ) strictly prefer
not to participate (and so choose x = ai) and hence for these types there is no
return to education, therefore they would drop out of the labor market process.￿
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1.4.2 Steady State Turnover
In order to solve the entry condition for equilibrium market tightness, I first de-
scribe steady state turnover. Suppose type i have ability ai > ac(θ) and so are
active labour market participants. Recall that Ei was defined as the number of
type i workers who are employed and Ui the number who are (active) unemployed.
Steady state implies
(m(θ) + φ)Ui = δEi + φηi (1.30)
where the LHS describes the flow of i type workers out of unemployment, while
the inflow is composed of employed workers who lose their jobs and those new
market entrants who are type i. As Ei +Ui = ηi this implies the number of active
type i unemployed worker is
Ui =
(φ+ δ)ηi
m(θ) + φ+ δ
. (1.31)
Similarly for the pool of employed workers. Note then that if both al, ah > ac(θ)
then the fraction of (active) unemployed workers who are type i is
Ui
Ul + Uh
= ηi
As π denotes the fraction of active unemployed workers who are low ability, then
π = ηl in this case. Conversely ah > ac(θ) > al implies low ability types are not
active in the labour market. As Ul = 0, this implies π = 0 : all active unemployed
workers are high ability. This eﬀect plays an important part in what follows.
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1.4.3 Wage Determination
I now determine the equilibrium wage function wN(x, θ). Again consider type i
with ability ai > ac(θ) and so are active labor market participants. Suppose such a
worker invests to productivity x and so enjoys value VU(x, θ). Let JF (x, θ) denote
the firm’s value of employing a worker with productivity x and JV (θ) denote the
value of a vacancy. Given β ∈ (0, 1) describes the worker’s bargaining power, Nash
bargaining implies the negotiated wage satisfies
β[JF (x, θ)− JV (θ)] = (1− β) [VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)] .
Of course a free entry equilibrium implies JV (θ) = 0 while
JF (x, θ) =
x− wN(x, θ)
r + δ + φ
(1.32)
as the job is closed only in the event that the worker dies or the job is destroyed.
By also substituting out VE(x, θ) − VU(x, θ) using the above, equilibrium Nash
wage agreement is:
wN(x, θ) =
β(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)x+ (1− β)(r + φ+ δ)b
(βm(θ) + r + φ+ δ)
(1.33)
The wage is thus a weighted of the worker’s productivity x and the worker’s flow
value of unemployment b, where the weight depend on θ and the worker’s bargain-
ing power β. Same as what I discussed in the first part of this chapter a rise in
the productivity of the worker makes the size of the surplus to be shared between
a firm and a worker with productivity x, bigger which causes the rise in the Nash
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bargaining wage.
1.4.4 The Value of a Vacancy
Consider now a firm participating in the labor market. Market tightness deter-
mines which types of workers are active in the labour market as ac = ac(θ). Recall
that π denotes the fraction of active unemployed workers who are type i = l and
that for types ai > ac(θ), their optimal productivity choice is x∗(ai, θ). In a free
entry equilibrium with random search, the expected value of a vacancy is:
rJV (θ) = −k + m(θ)
θ
[πJF (x
∗(al, θ), θ) + (1− π)(JF (x∗(ah, θ), θ)] (1.34)
where k is the flow cost of the vacancy. Free entry requires that new vacancies
are created until the capital of holding one is driven to zero, i.e., JV = 0. So, free
entry condition:
k =
m(θ)
θ
[πJF (x
∗(al, θ), θ) + (1− π)(JF (x∗(ah, θ), θ)] (1.35)
It is immediately obvious that by applying the Proposition 1, claim 2 from the first
part of the chapter and also knowing for ai > ac, x∗(ai, θ) is continuous and strictly
increasing function of ai and θ, we can find a reduced form free entry condition as
follows: inserting the expression for w = wN(x, θ) into equation (1.32) gives:
JF (x, θ) =
(r + φ+ δ)(1− β)(x∗ − b)
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
(1.36)
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Thus the free entry equation which specifies market tightness is defined by inserting
the wage equation into the JF and then substitute it out and rearranging the terms.
Thus identifying a market equilibrium reduces to finding a θ which solves the free
entry condition equation,
k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[π(θ)x∗(al, θ) + (1− π(θ))x∗(ah, θ)− b] (1.37)
where
π(θ) =
 0 if al < a
c(θ) < ah,
ηl if ac(θ) < al.
Note that if ac(θ) > ah then there are no active labour market participants and
there is no trade.
1.5 Decentralised Equilibrium
1.5.1 Definition
A market equilibrium is defined as follows:
ME1’: worker participate in the labor market if and only if ai ≥ ac where:
VU(x
∗(ac, θ), θ)− C(x∗(ac, θ), ac) = b
r + φ
(1.38)
ME2’: active participants choose optimal productivity choice x∗ where:
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C
∂x
(x∗(ai, θ), ai) (1.39)
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ME3’: free entry condition:
k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[π(θ)x∗(al, θ) + (1− π(θ))x∗(ah, θ)− b] (1.40)
ME4’: the proportion of active workers who are type i consistent with steady state
turnover; when low-type are active then π(θ) = ηl and when low-type is inactive
π(θ) = 0
1.5.2 Existence and Characterisation
There are three types of possible equilibria. I define
Ω(θ) =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[π(θ)x∗(al, θ) + (1− π(θ))x∗(ah, θ)− b] (1.41)
which describes the expected return to creating a vacancy. Identifying an equilib-
rium requires finding a θ which solves Ω(θ) = k. Note that m(θ) is a continuous
function of θ by assumption. The next step is to show that for ai > ac, that
x∗(ai, θ) is a continuous and increasing function of θ.
CLAIM 6: x∗(ai, θ) is a continuous and increasing function of θ and is strictly
increasing in ai.
Proof follows directly from Claim 3.
Claim 6 establishes that investment by active workers increases as market tight-
ness increases, and does so continuously. Furthermore, comparing workers who
are active, higher ability types invest to a strictly higher productivity level.
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LEMMA 1. As θ → 0, x∗(ai, θ)→ ai, for all ai > ac, ac(θ)→ b.
Proof. As θ → 0, equation(??) implies ∂VU (x,θ)∂x = 0. Hence as θ → 0, x∗(ai, θ)→ ai,
thus by (1.17), VU(x∗, θ)→ br+φ and (1.33) implies ac → b.
PROPOSITION 2. ∃ f s.t θi = f(ai) and is strictly decreasing with θi with
θi = 0 at ai = b.
Proof. Since ac(θi) is a function of single variable and from Proposition 1 it
is strictly decreasing in θ, the Inverse Function Theorem implies there exists
f(ai) = [ac]−1(ai) and
f ￿(ai) =
1
(ac(θ))￿
=
dθ
da
< 0
from Lemma 1 the proof is completed. ￿
It is now straightforward, using Lemma 1 and proposition 2, to identify Market
Equilibrium. Lets define θl and θh where
al = a
c(θl)
ah = a
c(θh).
Note that at market tightness θ = θi, workers with ability ai are indiﬀerent be-
tween being active in the labour market and not participating. As Proposition 1
establishes that ac(θ) is a strictly decreasing function of θ, then these definitions
imply θh < θl. This then implies three possible scenarios as depicted in Figure 1.4:
(i) If θ < θh then no workers are active in the labour market. With no loss of
generality we suppose Ω(.) = 0 in this region; i.e. the expected return to creating
a vacancy is zero.
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(ii) If θ ∈ (θh, θl) then types i = h are active as al < ac(θ) < ah. As this implies
π(θ) = 0, the expected return to a vacancy is:
Ω(θ) =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[x∗(ah, θ)− b].
Note Claim 6 implies Ω(.) is continuous in this range. Its slope is ambiguous,
however, as x∗(ah, .) is an increasing function.
(iii) if θ > θl, then all types are active as ac(θ) < al. As this implies π(θ) = ηl, the
expected return to a vacancy is:
Ω(θ) =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[ηlx
∗(al, θ) + ηhx∗(ah, θ)− b].
Again Claim 6 implies Ω(.) is continuous in this range. Furthermore in the first
part of this paper I proved that Ω(θ)→ 0 as θ →∞ [see proposition 1].
Of course Ω(θ) is not continuous in θ at θl, θh. Clearly Ω(.) increases by a discrete
amount at θh as Ω = 0 for θ < θh. At θl, however, it is easy to see that Ω(.) de-
creases by a discrete amount. The discontinuity is caused by low types switching
to being active and, by Claim 4, their productivity x∗(al, .) < x∗(ah, .). To be more
precise lets have a look at the each regions in details. A critical step is to note
that the nature of equilibrium depends on the continuity of the right hand side of
(1.40), i.e. Ω(θ, ai). Clearly as π(θ) is not continuous at ac = ai for i = l, h then
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Ω(.) is not continuous at that points.
CLAIM 7. ∃ θl s.t. l types drop out if θ < θl.
CLAIM 8. ∃ θh s.t. h types drop out if θ < θh.
CLAIM 9. Given the above claims there exist three types of equilibrium:
Region 1: The first is an equilibrium in which it is not beneficial for low/high
ability worker to invest in their productivity since θ ≤ θh i.e. al, ah < ac which
implies θ = 0 is equilibrium and clearly everyone are inactive in this case. This is
“autarchic equilibria” where workers do not participate to the labor market and
as a result, firms do not post vacancies. The main concern of this paper is to focus
on “non-autarchic” equilibria.
Region 2: The second is the region that θh ≤ θ < θl, which shows that only
high-ability type are active as al < ac < ah and accordingly, π(θ) = 0; the propor-
tion of active low ability workers is zero. Lets show the equilibrium equations for
this case are as follows:
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C(x∗(ah, θ); ah)
∂x
(1.42)
VU(x
∗(al, θ), θ)− C(x∗(al, θ); al) < b
r + φ
(1.43)
VU(x
∗(ah, θ), θ)− C(x∗(ah, θ); ah) > b
r + φ
(1.44)
k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
(x∗(ah, θ)− b) (1.45)
from the participation constraint for the above region it is clear that it is not ben-
eficial for low ability type to invest to her/his productivity. One can show that
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the LHS of (1.44) is increasing in market tightness. For the proof please look at
Appendix 1A. The low ability type takes life as leisure and accordingly they will
not participate in the labour market.
Region 3: The third is where θl ≤ θ which implies al, ah > ac. This region il-
lustrates a labor market that both types are active and participate in the labor
market as critical ability is lower even from the ability of low ability worker. I
term such a steady state equilibrium a “Joint Type Equilibrium”. This requires
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C(x∗(al, θ); al)
∂x
(1.46)
VU(x
∗(al, θ)− C(x∗(al, θ); al) > b
r + φ
(1.47)
k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[ηlx
∗(al, θ) + (1− ηl)x∗(ah, θ)− b)] (1.48)
Ω(.) and k are illustrated on the vertical axis and market tightness is shown on the
horizontal axis in Figure 1.4. The place that the critical ability meets the ability
of high type corresponds to the market tightness in the region 2 and accordingly,
Ω(.) = Ω(θ, ah). The place that the critical ability meets the ability of low type
corresponds to market tightness in the region 3 with Ω(.) = Ω(θ, alh). Of course if
the critical ability is really high even higher than the ability of high type then no
one participate and region 1 represent that on the Figure 1.4.
Of course, as set above, at the point where θ = θl subject to ac = al, the gap
between the two graphs illustrates those workers that are indiﬀerent being active
or inactive.
In order that this type of Equilibrium occurs, it must be worthwhile for just
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Figure 1.4: The Equilibrium Value of Market Tightness
high-ability active unemployed to participate in the labor market; VU(x∗(al, θ), θ)−
C(x∗(al, θ); al) < br+φ must hold. Similarly, Joint Type equilibrium requires VU(x
∗(al, θ)−
C(x∗(al, θ); al) > br+φ . Mixed Strategy arises because at θ = θl there exist some
workers with ac = al who are indiﬀerent being active or inactive.
1.5.3 Multiple Equilibria
Multiple equilibria, can arise if the Ω function is increasing at θ. Lets look at the
active constraint equation at θ = θh
b
r + φ
<
(r + φ+ δ)b+m(θ)w(x)
(r + φ)(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)
− C
Substituting w(x) and rearranging, we have
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C <
m(θ)β(x∗(a, θ)− b)
(r + φ)(βm(θ) + r + δ + φ)
where C = m(θh)β(x
∗−b)
(r+φ)(βm(θh)+r+δ+φ)
, inserting C into the above equation and also find-
ing x∗ from the optimal productivity constraint and substituting it in the above
equation we have,
m(θh)− θhm￿(θh)
θhm￿(θh)
CxxC
(Cx)2
βm(θh) + r + δ + φ
r + δ + φ
≤ 1 (1.49)
ξm(θ),θ ξMC,C
βm(θh) + r + δ + φ
Cx(r + δ + φ)
≤ 1 (1.50)
where ξm(θ),θ is the elasticity of matching with respect to the stock of vacancies and
ξMC,C is the elasticity of marginal cost function with respect to the cost function.
Clearly to construct an example lets assume C(xi; ai) = x
γ
i a
−1
i , then
1− α
α
γ − 1
γ
βm(θh) + r + δ + φ
r + δ + φ
≤ 1 (1.51)
multiple equilibria i.e; having ∂Ω(θ)∂θ > 0, requires the following: If the elasticity
of arrival rate of vacancy to the worker i.e.α is close to one; the marginal cost of
investing in productivity is more elastic with respect to productivity investment
i.e. γ and also worker’s bargaining power goes to zero, i.e; β = 0 so that workers
appropriate nothing, nearly zero, of the surplus. It is important to understand,
however, that multiple equilibrium do not occur for all possible parameter config-
urations.
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1.6 Is Heterogeneity the Cause of Multiplicity?
By Comparing the equilibrium part in two types case and the first part of the
paper, the immediate question is raised as to whether heterogeneity is the cause of
multiplicity? To answer this question, suppose workers are homogenous, in order
that multiple equilibria occurs, it must be check that Ω(.) is increasing at θ. That
is:
θm￿(θ)−m(θ)
θ2
(x∗(ah, θ)− b)(1− β)
βm(θ) + r + δ + φ
+
m(θ)
θ
β(r + δ + φ)
r + φ
m￿(θ)
(βm(θ) + r + δ + φ)3
1− β
Cxx
> 0
where Cxx is the second derivative of productivity cost function w.r.t productivity.
As the expression for optimal productivity choice is:
∂C(x∗)
∂x
=
βm(θ)
(r + φ)(βm(θ) + r + δ + φ)
(1.52)
Inserting the above expression for Cx(x∗(θ; a)), gives
m(θ)− θm￿(θ)
θ
x∗ − b
m￿(θ)(r + δ + φ)
(βm(θ) + r + δ + φ)Cxx
Cx
≤ 1 (1.53)
By looking at above equation one can claim that if optimal productivity choice is
close to unemployment benefit b then ∂Ω∂θ > 0. Note that x
∗ close to b contradict
the active search constraint, so heterogeneity is not the cause of multiplicity.
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1.7 Conclusion
Workers and firms face considerable problem contacting each other and of course
these diﬃculties have consequences on the equilibrium characteristics of the labor
market. This paper studies an equilibrium search model that highlights the role of
inherent ability and productivity investment in the labor market. My argument is
related to the endogenous participation and investment decision of heterogeneous
workers who have an inherent ability level. When productivity investment is costly
and workers are heterogeneous in ability one can think only the ablest choose to
acquire productivity(education). While here I show the important role of critical
ability and cost of investing on productivity which makes the result diﬀerent.
Clearly the active constraint plays an important role in the analysis and makes
it possible to examine the interaction between critical ability and market tightness
and also the choice of optimal productivity investment. I show here those with
ability above critical ability will participate in the labour market. The choice of
participation involves an opportunity costs in terms of forgone utility of leisure and
direct cost of productivity investment. I prove that the critical ability decreases
in market tightness while optimal productivity investment increases in market
tightness and ability of the worker.
Accounting for the critical ability and optimal productivity, I derive the out-
come of wage bargaining. Embedding the wage bargaining with free entry condi-
tion, optimal productivity investment and participation decision, I describe equi-
librium characteristics. I show the existence of equilibrium and then extend the
model for two types case of workers since it gives a better description of the equi-
librium and probability of existence of multiple equilibrium. Equilibrium can take
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one of the following forms. One in which it is beneficial for both types of workers
to be active in the labour market, I call it the “Joint Type Equilibrium”, second
one is the one that only there is willingness of high ability workers to invest in their
productivity and finally the last one is the one where there is no benefit for either
types to invest in their productivity and consequently there is no participation of
workers in the labour market and no posting of vacancies from the firm side.
Given two types workers does it imply that multiple equilibrium exist? The
model could answer the question, it could exist under certain conditions. Finally,
it is worth remarking that because of the heterogeneity in the extended part,
multiplicity will not raise or -i.e. heterogeneity is not the cause of multiplicity.
In the second chapter of the thesis I focus on the optimal policy applying on
the two case types of the first chapter. Allowing the central planner to use diﬀerent
policies such as training subsidies, lump sum participation tax and job creation
subsidy, I show conditions under which these policies are eﬃcient in increasing the
output of the economy.
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1.8 Appendix 1A.
Define
Ψi(θ) =
1
r
[
(r + δ)b+m(θ)w(x∗i )
(r + δ +m(θ))
]− C(x∗i , a∗i ) (1.54)
as we proves x∗i is chosen optimally, the Envelope Theorem implies
dΨi
dθ
=
m￿(θ)
r
(r + δ)(w − b)
(r + δ +m(θ))2
> 0 (1.55)
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Chapter 2
The Eﬃciency of Productivity Investment
in Search Equilibrium Framework
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the eﬃciency in an economy with endogenous productivity
investment decision of heterogeneous workers who have diﬀerent inherent ability
level as described in the first chapter of this thesis. In this chapter I show that the
economy which I introduced in the first chapter is ineﬃcient. This is due to the fact
that workers do not internalise the firm’s cost of posting a vacancy, the productivity
investment of the other workers and the search intensity is lower in the economy.
Therefore, the labor market is overcrowded with low ability workers who have
less investment in productivity and reduce the probability that high productivity
workers match. So, the goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how the government
can achieve eﬃciency in this economy by observing the productivity investment of
the workers. Therefore, assuming the government can observe workersducation, I
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allow the government to use diﬀerent policies to get an eﬃcient allocation in the
economy. In my first best policy scenario, I find the government should subsidise
training, subsidise job creation and tax labour market participation.
First the implementation of endogenous productivity investment allows me to
analyse the hold up problem mentioned in the literature. A natural holdup and
ineﬃciencies arise in a market with ex ante investments and trading frictions.
Basically, an investment is held up if one party must pay the cost while others
share in the payoﬀ. In many situations, investments must be sunk before agents
meet each other. For example, workers must complete their education before
finding jobs. As agents do not know who their partners will be at the time of
investment, related arrangements or contracts are impossible (Acemoglu, 1996).
In particular, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the equilibrium is
always ineﬃcient. One could say to remove the bargaining power from the workers,
but this, in turn, depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive
entry of firms.
Here, the purpose of this chapter is to show how the planner can achieve eﬃ-
ciency in an economy having endogenous productivity with heterogeneous workers
where the government cannot observe whether the worker is high or low ability
type but education is observable by the government. Also, it is well established in
the literature that private decisions in markets with random job matching gener-
ates ineﬃciencies. Of course these ineﬃciencies are through externalities. In the
previous chapter I derive a set of necessary conditions for market solution. In the
present chapter I look for the corresponding allocation that maximises steady-state
net output and compare the solution with the decentralised result.
Therefore assuming the education level of the workers is observable by the
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government, I allow the government to use diﬀerent policies such as job creation
subsidy, training subsidy and tax participation, applying the principle of target-
ing1to get an eﬃcient allocation in the economy.
The implementation of training subsidy policy allows me to analyse the inter-
action of it with worker bargaining power. Solving the optimal training subsidy
policy shows that higher worker’s bargaining power leads to implementation of
a lower training subsidy in order to restore investment decision eﬃciency. This
result is interesting since it can guide the hold up problem. That is, it is in-
teresting when individuals make ex ante investments before matching with firms,
disregarding their ability, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the
equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Wages increase with productivity investment, creating
problem for unemployed active job seekers’ investment, also all the bargaining
power is controlled by the workers leading to very high wage level and excessive
entry of workers. Clearly with ex ante investments, no bargaining solution achieves
eﬃciency, and the eﬃciency result is more striking.
The labour market participation tax would not seem realistic. But we can
think in terms of education policy, such as graduate loans or graduate tax. Should
the government subsidise tertiary education2and, if so, might it fund students with
graduate loans or a graduate tax?
Most of the existing literature focuses on the design of optimal education poli-
cies. Since higher education is costly and faces competing imperatives for public
spending therefore tertiary education is an important element in national eco-
1In several papers in the 1960s such as Bhagwati (1971), the general principle of targeting in
economic policy was developed. The main concern in the principle of targeting is the distortions
from the usual marginal conditions of Pareto-eﬃciency which are best tackled by using policy
instruments that do directly on the relevant margin.
2Tertiary education refers to any further education (FE) pursued beyond the high school level.
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nomic performance and a major determinant of a person’s life chances. It requires
a funding system by which institutions can charge diﬀerent prices, but many peo-
ple argue that the tertiary education should be financed from taxation. Higher
education in most advanced economies is heavily subsidised by government and
they are justified on eﬃciency grounds by externalities. For this, it is important to
know what eﬀect the education subsidy and the taxes that finance them (here we
called the participation tax) have on the improvement of the economy.3The UK
higher education has been subject to a number of changes since 1969s, and the
system has moved from one where it was financed by the taxpayer to one where
graduates themselves now contribute to the cost of their education.4
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) in their general equilibrium micro-simulation
model concluded that tuition subsidies could raise the welfare of the least able
workers through general equilibrium eﬀects on the wages of the unskilled. Keane
and Wolpin (1997) micro-simulation model concluded quite the opposite -that only
the most able would benefit from a tuition subsidy. These models are very com-
plex and depend on huge amount of assumptions, it is diﬃcult to draw from them
firm conclusions concerning when tuition subsidies might help the unskilled and
when they might not. The debate about student finance should be around the de-
velopment of the loans, fees and bursaries systems. Shackleton (2010) argue that
financing higher education by a tax imposed on those graduates -simply because
they are graduates- is a bad idea. He thinks this is a tax that would be unrelated
3In early 1960s the UK government became concerned that the UK higher education sector
was relatively small compared to the rest of the developed world- the UKs Higher education
participation rate at around 6 percent, was one of the lowest in the OECD (Barr and Crawford
2005). The government were mainly concerned that the lack of higher education in the workforce
would stop economic growth.
4I do not discuss here about the distributional consequences of this subsidy.
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to the cost of an individual’s higher education and only loosely related to its ben-
efits. Also he argues how would the government define a ‘degree’ for the purpose
of the tax and what would happen to those who had higher tertiary education
in UK (for example) and then went to live abroad? While graduate loans are a
personal debt and individuals can be tracked even when they move overseas. Of
course there is no agreement that graduate tax could be imposed on those working
in other countries.
The idea behind graduate tax is straightforward. The government is in eﬀect
financing the human capital investment by subsidising higher education. The
main future benefits to the graduate is in the form of higher earnings. Because of
this investment the government is entitled to a dividend from the ensuing income
benefits and takes the form of percentage tax on graduates’ income over their
working lives. In this paper for simplicity I consider a fixed tax when workers
enter in the labor market. The labor market participation tax here resembles the
graduate tax. 5
In 1990, the first UK students loan scheme was implemented. Graduate loan
oﬀers a plausible solution to the problem the planner could explore alternative
devices for cost recovery such as graduate tax. In this paper the participation tax
could be considered as graduate tax. Although most studies have been optimistic
about the eﬀectiveness of graduate loans as a cost recovery programs. Albrecht and
Ziderman 1993, examines those eﬀects and identifies some fundamental flaws in
existing programs. They discussed that a graduate tax could bring in significantly
more revenue than traditional loan program.
5Higher education in most advanced economies is heavily subsidised by the government. The
discussion about the eﬃciency and equity , Johnson (2004) is not discussed here.
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How best to finance higher education sector is an ongoing issue in most coun-
tries. Barr (2004) list twenty factors against a graduate tax, as to why this ap-
proach to funding higher education should not be considered. He emphasises that
apart from all these reason there is common sense factor that needs to take into
account. But one can ask Why should government subsidy education? Who ben-
efits from higher education? One can answer these questions by discussing about
the private return to tertiary education (Steel and Sausman (1997)),Social and
Cultural Benefits (Bynner and Egerton (2000)), Social rates of return to higher
education (Layard et al.(2002)), education and growth (Bassanini and Scarpetta
(2001)).
Booth and Coles (2010) prove how the taxes and social security payments di-
rectly aﬀect the participation decision. Their results provide supporting evidence
for the observation motivating their paper. Their model shows how the partic-
ipation decision can lead to under participation and as a result have eﬀect on
individuals’ decisions to invest in acquiring skills. They apply a tax on labour
income which leads to large substitution eﬀects to home production.
The general eﬃciency condition in here is based on a labor force participation
margin and the optimal investment decision which are absent in most specification
of search frameworks. Building upon the above findings, this chapter contributes to
the existing literature extending the analysis of optimal policy in the search and
matching equilibrium framework, with productivity investment and risk neutral
workers. I analyse diﬀerent policies as training subsidy, participation fee entry
and job creation subsidy to get eﬃcient allocation in an economy with education
investment. I show the key roles of these policies to achieve eﬃciency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section I present
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the model and review market equilibrium solution from the first chapter following
the social planner problem. In the third part I show that the decentralised solution
is ineﬃcient. In the fourth section I focus on the three diﬀerent policies that can
be implemented by the planner that may achieve an eﬃcient allocation. Finally I
summarise the main finding of this chapter.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Basic Framework
The present model builds on the first chapter. This analysis considers only steady
state, where time is continuous and the economy is composed of workers and
employers. All employers are identical whose number is endogenously determined
by a standard free entry condition. Workers diﬀer in their abilities. Given their
ability ai, each entrant type i first invests in education and so determines his/her
productivity level x. Let C(x; ai) denote the cost of investing to productivity
x given initial ability ai. Assume C(.) is strictly increasing, convex and twice
diﬀerentiable in x. C(.) is decreasing in a (it is less costly for a higher ability
to achieve a given productivity level) and Cxa < 0 so that higher ability types
face a lower marginal cost to achieving a higher productivity level x. For ease of
exposition assume the Inada condition Cx(ai, ai) = 0.
There is turnover of workers where φ is the inflow of new entrants and all
workers die according to a Poisson process with parameter φ. Thus steady state
implies there is a unit measure of workers in the economy. There are two types of
entrants: those with low-ability (al) and those with high-ability (ah). Let i ∈ {l, h}
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denote a worker’s type.The proportion of high ability type is 1− η.
After investing in productivity x, a type i entrant decides whether to search
or not. I define those who choose to search as active job seekers, all others are
inactive (non-participant). Clearly as education is costly, those who choose to be
inactive will also choose zero education. Conversely the Inada condition ensures
those who are active choose a strictly positive education level. Of those who choose
to be active, let 1− π denote the proportion who are high ability.
To fill a job, an employer must first create a vacancy at flow cost k. If V denotes
the number of vacancies and U = UAl + U
A
h the number of active unemployed job
seekers, then the match flow is described by a matching function M = M(U, V )
which is increasing in both arguments and has constant returns. Let θ = VU
denote market tightness. As active job seekers meet vacancies at rate MU , standard
arguments imply this job contact rate is m(θ) ≡M(1, θ) and m(.) is an increasing
concave function. Similarly m(θ)θ is the rate at which a firm holding a vacancy
contacts an active job seeker. Random search implies (1 − π)m(θ)θ is the rate at
which a firm contacts an active job seeker with high ability. Finally, job matches
break up at an exogenous rate δ in which case the worker returns to the pool
of unemployed workers. In the previous chapter of this thesis, I derived a set of
necessary conditions of market solution. I focused on the part two of chapter one
which lays out the model with two types of workers. Lets recall the definition of
market equilibrium from previous chapter:
ME1’: worker participate in the labor market if and only if ai ≥ ac where:
VU(x
∗(ac, θ), θ)− C(x∗(ac, θ), ac) = b
r + φ
(2.1)
56
ME2’: active participants choose optimal productivity choice x∗ where:
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
=
∂C
∂x
(x∗(ai, θ), ai) (2.2)
ME3’: free entry condition:
k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[π(θ)x∗(al, θ) + (1− π(θ))x∗(ah, θ)− b] (2.3)
ME4’: the proportion of active workers who are type i consistent with steady state
turnover; when low-type are active then π(θ) = ηl and when low-type is inactive
π(θ) = 0.
In the next section, I compare private and social necessary conditions. I show
that private returns are not equal to social returns, since the individuals do not
internalize the eﬀect of their productivity investment choice and their participation
choice on firm’s incentives to post vacancy and on the other workers with diﬀerent
abilities. I show this point formally in the next section. For this purpose, I consider
the problem of the benevolent social planner.
2.2.2 Social Planner’s Problem
Following Hosios (1990), I solve the social planner problem which determines the
eﬃcient allocation on the above economy. I assume the planner’s discount rate
equals to zero. By allowing this assumption I simplify the analysis to compare
steady-state solutions rather than having to determine the discounted value of the
change in some variable along the convergent path from one solution to another.
The Planner chooses {Ei, UAi , V, xi} to maximise steady state aggregate net of
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output minus productivity investment and search cost in the economy, where Ei
is the number of type i employed worker , UAi is the number of type i active
unemployed workers, V is the number of total vacancies in the economy and xi
refers to the flow output produced by low/high ability worker. For simplicity the
planner problem is :
max
Ei,xi,UAi ,V
P = Σi=l,h(Eixi + [ηi − Ei]b)− Σi=l,h(φ[UAi + Ei])C(xi; ai)− kV. (2.4)
Welfare is the sum of output produce by active low/high ability job seekers net
of unemployment benefit to the inactive unemployed workers, minus the sum of
investment productivity costs for both types and the total cost of posting vacancies
in the economy. The planner should maximises P subject to the steady sate
turnover6 :
UAi (φ+m(θ)) = δEi + φ(U
A
i + Ei) for i = l , h (2.5)
where θ = V
UAl +U
A
h
. Since m(θ) is the arrival rate of vacancies and φ is arrival
rate of new entrants, the flow of low/high ability job seekers out of unemployment
is (m(θ) + φ)UAi . The corresponding flow into active unemployment is δEi +
φ(UAi + Ei) where Ei is the number of low/high ability employed worker in the
labor market. Lets define a control λi =
Ei+UAi
ηi
where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1. λi defines the
proportion of type i who are active. Clearly if both types choose λi = 1, then
the number of unemployed workers is same as number of active workers in this
economy. Consequently the proportion of active workers who are low/high ability
type is equal to the number of workers of low/high type. Also if λi = 0 then no
one participate in the labor market ,i.e. Ei = −UAi = 0. Using the expression for
6The detailed solution of Planner problem is in the Appendix 2A.
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πi where
πi =
ηi[
Ei+UAi
Ei+Ui
]
ηl[
UAl +El
El+Ul]
+ ηh[
UAh +Eh
Uh+Eh
]
which denotes the proportion active agents who are low ability in the economy, if
λi = 0 then πi = 0 and for the case that λi = 1 then πi = ηi. Given λi and the
steady state turnover constraint (2.5) then the planner’s problem equation (2.4)
reduces to:7
max
xi,λi,θ
P = Σi=l,h
λiηim(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
xi + Σi=l,h[ηi − λiηim(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
]b− (2.6)
k
θ(φ+ δ)
m(θ) + φ+ δ
Σi=l,h(λiηi)− Σi=l,hφ[ηiλiC(xi; ai)].
This is the standard optimisation problem solved by the Lagrangian method. The
necessary conditions for optimality are described in Appendix 2B.
In the standard matching model, the decentralised allocation is ineﬃcient un-
less the so-called Hosios Condition holds.8 To highlight the novel ineﬃciency, a
series of possible optimal productivity investment, labor market participation and
vacancy creation decision externalities are explained in the next section. Later I
assume the planner has three tools to alter the market outcome.
7See Appendix for the complete solution.
8This Condition states that without a capital choice, the equilibrium is optimal if and only if
the worker’s bargaining share is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
the number of vacancies.
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2.3 Eﬃciency
2.3.1 Socially Eﬃcient Labor Market Tightness
Using the first order conditions presented in the previous part, I solve the eﬃcient
labor market tightness θ.
PROPOSITION 2.1. The socially eﬃcient labor market tightness is given by:
k =
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) [
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
xl +
λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
xh − b] (2.7)
The Hosios rule sets the worker share of the net surplus equal to the elasticity of
the matching function with respect to unemployment. It can be written
1− β = m
￿(θ)θ
m(θ)
. (2.8)
From chapter one I know that the labor market tightness in the decentralised case
without policy is given by:
k =
m(θ)(1− β)
θ(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
[π(θ)x∗(al, θ) + (1− π(θ))x∗(ah, θ)− b] (2.9)
If the Hosios condition holds then, given that participation is eﬃcient then the
decentralised free entry condition will be equal to the planner solution. (see Ap-
pendix 2C)
Consider those individuals that are indiﬀerent to participate in labor market,
from the participation constraint lets substitute xi−b into above market and plan-
ner free entry conditions then:
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k =
m￿(θ)φ
m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ [πC(xl; al) + (1− π)C(xh; ah)] Planner solution,
k =
(1− β)φ
βθ
[πC(xl; al) + (1− π)C(xh; ah)] Market solution.
Equating the corresponding social planner and market productivity’s investment
decision gives m
￿(θ)θ
m(θ) = 1 − β. Observe that if the worker is indiﬀerent to par-
ticipate in the labor market then Hosios Condition will be satisfied. This result
extends Hosios’(1990) results, which showed that without a capital choice, the
equilibrium is optimal if and only if the worker’s bargaining share is equal to the
elasticity of the matching function, however, with endogenous capital investment,
this bargaining share leads to hold up problems, as shown previously. At the root
of excessive of posting vacancies result is the fact that firms create a negative ex-
ternality when they enter, since they make it harder for the other firms to find
workers. Simultaneously, they create positive externality on workers irrespective
of their abilities because they increase the probability that workers find employ-
ment. Basically increase entry of low ability workers’s participation imposes a
diseconomy on existing participants and external economy on firms. Hence, firms
create more vacancies, leading to further vacancy creation and so on. The balance
of these forces is ambiguous in general but depends on the relative share of surplus
going to workers and firms and the optimal productivity investment of the workers
according to their ability and cost of investment.
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2.3.2 Socially Eﬃcient Productivity Investment
Using the first order conditions of the planner problem, I can solve the socially
eﬃcient productivity levels xi.
PROPOSITION 2.2. The socially eﬃcient productivity investment xi is given
by:
∂C
∂xi
=
m(θ)
φ(φ+ δ +m(θ))
(2.10)
Proof. solving the necessary condition (2.22) for optimality as described in Ap-
pendix 2A complete the proof.
In chapter one I have shown that the solutions for the decentralised case is given
by:
∂C
∂x
(x∗i (θ), ai) =
m(θ)β
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
(2.11)
9 Observe that (2.10) represents the marginal cost of productivity investment when
the planner choose x optimally. Whereas (2.11) represents marginal cost of pro-
ductivity investment when the individual chooses her/his productivity optimally.
The diﬀerence between these solution is in parameter β which is the worker bar-
gaining power. Investment in productivity reveals the hold up problem. Hold up
arise because workers must invest in productivity before meeting a firm, and firms
may reap some of the benefits from larger investments. Therefore, the correspond-
ing social and private marginal investment solutions are equal if and only if worker
has got full bargaining power. When individuals make ex ante investments before
matching with firms disregard their ability and also wages are determined by ex
post bargaining, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient.10 Wages increase with productivity
9As agents optimal expenditure decisions ignore the share to be obtained by their trading
partners, agents’s search and recruitment expenditures are ineﬃcient, Mortensen(1982a).
10This result is related to Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) findings.
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investment, creating hold up problem for unemployed active job seekers’ invest-
ment, also all the bargaining power is controlled by the workers leading to very
high wage level and excessive entry of workers. Clearly with ex ante investments,
no bargaining solution achieves eﬃciency. It is often emphasised that human cap-
ital externalities raise output at the aggregate level, here it is clear that the social
solution exceed the market solution unless the worker’s bargaining power is equal
to one.
2.3.3 Socially Eﬃcient Participation Level
Using the first order conditions presented in Appendix 2A, I can solve the socially
eﬃcient participation level λi.
PROPOSITION 2.3. From the social point of view, an individual with produc-
tivity xi will participate in the labor market only if
xi > b+
φ(φ+δ+m(θ)
m(θ) C(xi) +
kθ(φ+δ)
m(θ) .
The standard search model features a fixed size of the labor force (see, for in-
stance, Pissarides (2000)) while in here I endogenies the labor force participation.
With fixed participation, Hosios (1990) showed that the wage rule decentralises
the eﬃcient labor market allocation if and only if the bargaining power of the
worker equals the elasticity of the number of aggregate matches with respect to
the number of individuals searching for the jobs. While the supplies of labour
have as yet been endogenous, we are able to determine whether their incentives
for entry are eﬃcient. In this case, we can determine the parameter λi which
shows the proportion of high/low ability workers who are active that is those who
participate in the labor market. Diamond (1982b) argue that the presence of an
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additional worker(firm) makes the entry easier(harder) for vacancies to find work-
ers but harder(easier) for workers to find jobs. Observe that labor heterogeneity
and cost of investing on productivity make the additional source of ineﬃciency
from those identified by the matching literature. In the chapter one I have shown
the participation decision of market solution is given by:
If xi > b+
φ(φ+δ+βm(θ)
βm(θ) C(x
∗
i ) then participate.
In words, given the eﬃcient optimal productivity investment, eﬃcient labor mar-
ket participation requires no cost of posting vacancy which can be concluded from
equating the numerator of the last part planner participation that is kθ(φ+δ)m(θ) to
zero.
In the traditional search and matching models we have two traditional external-
ities. When firms enter the market, they make it harder for other firms to find
workers, so a negative externality is happened (congestion externality), but since
they increase the probability that workers find employment a positive externality
on workers is happened (thick market externality)[see Pissarides (2000)]. These
two externalities cancel each other under the Hosios condition. Notice that in my
model I find additional externality called “composition externality”. It is created
by the diﬀerent types of workers searching for a job with diﬀerent productivity in-
vestment. Therefore, labor market is overcrowded with low productivity workers
who search for a job and reduce the probability that high productivity workers
match. Clearly these externalities makes the decentralised solution ineﬃcient.
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2.4 Policy Implications
The next step is to examine whether policy can improve on the decentralised
allocation. In this case the government can uses diﬀerent policy instruments. I
study three policy instruments that may allow us to achieve the First Best in the
economy. I assume that the government apply the principle of targeting11 and
implement the following policies: training subsidy s for those who invest on their
education, labour market participation tax t and finally a job creation subsidy
z. It is also of interest to know more generally how, these policies interact with
worker bargaining power to aﬀect eﬃciency.
2.4.1 Optimal Training Subsidy Policy
I first introduce the optimal training subsidy and show that how it interact with
worker bargaining power to aﬀect eﬃciency. Lets introduce ei which is the diﬀer-
ence between the inherent ability ai and the ex-post productivity xi of the worker,
i.e. xi = ai + ei. The productivity investment cost C(xi; ai) features the same as
C(ai + ei; ai) ≡ Cˆ(ei; ai)
So, we can simply define
C(xi; ai) = C(ai + ei; ai) ≡ Cˆ(ei; ai).
11The generalisation of the principle of targeting is in line with Dixit, Grossman and Help-
man (1996). In their common agency model, more eﬃcient instruments are chosen because the
government cares about social welfare.
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Introducing the optimal training subsidy per unit of investment s applied by the
government leads to
[1− s]∂Cˆ
∂ei
(ei; ai) =
βm(θ)
φ(φ+ δ + βm(θ))
(2.12)
PROPOSITION 2.4. The optimal training subsidy that targets the eﬃcient
productivity investment decision level is given by:
s∗ = 1− β(φ+ δ +m(θ))
(φ+ δ + βm(θ))
(2.13)
Proof. Substituting (2.10) into (2.12) and rearranging the terms, I find the optimal
policy in proposition (2.4). ￿
COROLLARY. The optimal education subsidy rate is given:
If β = 1 then s∗ = 0 and
If β < 1 then s∗ = (1−β)(φ+δ)φ+δ+βm(θ) > 0.
Assuming β = 1 then the optimal education subsidy will be equal to zero and
it eliminates the investment decision externality. For the case that worker has
some bargaining power but not the full , then optimal training policy is positive.
It turns out that a higher worker’s bargaining power leads to implement a lower
training subsidy in order to restore investment decision eﬃciency. One way of
achieving productivity investment decision eﬃciency is to raise worker bargaining
power so that worker appropriate all of the surplus. This formalises the notation
that eﬃciency requires a solution to the hold up problem. Since firms do not share
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in the cost of ex-ante productivity investments, this leads to underinvestment.
2.4.2 Participation Tax Policy
I now turn to a formal analysis of the eﬀects of participation fee(tax) entry policy.
The reason of introducing this policy is to deter the individuals with low ability
to participate in the labor market. Let t be the lump-sum fee entry regardless of
skill, so an active unemployed worker value function with this policy is given by:
(r + φ)VU(x, θ) = b− t+m(θ)[VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)] (2.14)
and when employed,
(r + φ)VE(x, θ) = w(x, θ) + δ[VU(x, θ)− VE(x, θ)]. (2.15)
It is simple to show that imposing the participation fee policy the wage will be
wp =
x(rφ+ δ +m(θ)β) + (b− t)(1− β)(r + φ+ δ)
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
(2.16)
and accordingly the value of being active unemployed worker substituting (2.17)
into (2.14) gives:
VU(x, θ) =
(b− t)(r + φ+ δ) +m(θ)βx
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
. (2.17)
PROPOSITION 2.5. Using the optimal productivity investment policy s∗, the
optimal labour market tax participation is given by the following condition:
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t∗ = βkθ +
φ
φ+ δ
[(φ+ δ)(β − 1) + s(φ+ δ + βm(θ))C(x; ai)] (2.18)
Proof. Using the decentralised participation constraint and substitution gives,
x > b+
t(r + φ+ δ)
m(θ)β
+
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)(1− s∗)
m(θ)β
(2.19)
given the optimal training subsidy policy solution, comparing with the social plan-
ner solution, i.e;
x > b+
kθ(φ+ δ)
m(θ)
+
φ(φ+ δ +m(θ)
m(θ)
C(x; ai),
rearranging the terms, I find the solution in proposition (2.5). ￿
If β = 1 ⇒ s∗ = 0 ⇒ t∗ = kθ, the first thing to note is that if β = 1 (i.e. worker
bargaining power is full) s∗ = 0 as claimed, so that the optimal labour market
participation fee will be equal to kθ. It is also apparent that if β is less than
one, the optimal fee policy will be βkθ. The term kθ is commonly interpreted
as the value of saved hiring costs due to the existence of an additional matched
worker, and for the case that β is less than one we can see the optimal fee entry
is βkθ which often interpreted as the capitalised value built into negotiated wage,
shared according the worker’s bargaining power. One might conjecture from this
that introducing a lump-sum tax entry will be ineﬀective while it would discourage
workers to participate in labor market. It is the interest to know how in equilibrium
this type of taxation interact with worker bargaining power to aﬀect eﬃciency. It
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turns out that these two policies are closely related.12
2.4.3 Job Creation Subsidy Policy
Now suppose that some of the fee entry is redistributed as lump-sum payments to
firms to subsidised the cost of posting a vacancy. Let this subsidy be z. The value
of a vacant job is,
rJV (θ) = −k + z + m(θ)
θ
[π(JF (x
∗
l (θ)− JV ) + (1− π)(JF (x∗h(θ))− JV (θ)]
PROPOSITION 2.6. Using the optimal policies s∗ and t∗, the optimal job
creation subsidy z∗ is given by,
z∗ =
￿
[
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) −
m(θ)(1− β)
θ(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
]× (2.20)
[
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
(xl − b) + λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
(xh − b)]− βkm(θ) 1− β
φ+ δ + βm(θ)
￿
.
Of course this is the solution of the case that β is strictly between 0 and 1. Clearly
z∗ is positive as long as the multiplication of the two bracket on the right hand
side of equation(2.20) is greater than βkm(θ)(1−β)βm(θ)+φ+δ .
Finally, when worker has full bargaining power the optimal job creation subsidy
is equal to the social planner’s cost of creating a vacancy. That is ,
12Bovenberg and Jacobs(2005) consider optimal tax policy where the government taxes labour
income but, as workers also underinvest in education, government oﬀers education subsidies.
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z∗ = (
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ))[
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
(xl − b) + λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
(xh − b)].
The detailed solution is in Appendix 2D.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses eﬃciency in an equilibrium search model with endogenous
productivity investment with one-sided heterogeneity. I have shown that the mar-
ket solution is not eﬃcient, since workers and firms do not internalize the cost of
posting a vacancy of the firms, participation decision and productivity investment
of the workers. The market solution implies that the productivity investment of
the worker is lower than the planner’s solution which reveals the hold up problem.
It arises because worker must invest in productivity before meeting a firm and
firm reaping some of the benefits from the worker’s investment. The decentralised
solution implies that workers with low productivity will participate in the labour
market, therefore job creation and labour market tightness will not be equal to
social planner case. Therefore, the number of workers with low productivity in the
economy is high and the job creation is low.
Since the market solution is not eﬃcient, optimal policies are required. Assum-
ing the government observes the worker’s eduction, I consider participation labour
market tax policy where the government taxes participant workers, as workers
underinvest in education, it in addition oﬀers education subsidies. I show that
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training subsidy for those who decide to participate in the labor market, increases
the incentive to invest on productivity. On the other hand, training subsidy for
those who are low ability type will increase incentive to be active. The introduc-
tion of a participation tax will have a perverse eﬀects; it deters workers incentive
to enter to the labor market since it is a kind of tax(fee) required to be paid as
soon as he/she enters labor market.
This eﬀect is more obvious for workers with low ability, it reduces the incentive
for them to participate in the labour market. Of course the income flow of inac-
tive unemployed workers(unemployment benefit) is important determinant of the
participation and investment decision. Not surprisingly taxes on labor market par-
ticipation and training subsidy distort human capital investment and participation
decision at diﬀerent ability levels. But these distortions are potentially high for
those individuals at the participation margin, whose abilities are close to thresh-
old(critical) ability, i.e. who are indiﬀerent to participate in the labour market.
The other additional insight from the paper is that the planner, using principle of
targeting internalizes the externality by means of the eﬃcient instrument, i.e. the
one that aims directly at the source.
From the arguments of proceeding chapter it is clear for the two types case of
workers that the degree of ineﬃciency of equilibrium turns on the degree of worker
bargaining power, β. I remark throughout the paper that one way of achieving
eﬃciency is to raise worker bargaining power so that workers appropriate all of
the surplus. One might conjecture that how introducing participation fee τ , job
creation subsidy z and training subsidy s in equilibrium they interact with worker
bargaining power to aﬀect eﬃciency. It turns out that these optimal policies are
closely related. Applying the principle of targeting shows when workers achieve all
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the surplus the optimal training subsidy equal to zero and the optimal participa-
tion tax will be hence kθ. Therefore the optimal job creation subsidy is positive.
If the Hosios condition holds, then given that participation is eﬃcient then the
decentralised, free entry condition will be equal to the planner solution.
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2.6 Appendix 2A
Social Planner Problem
Lets assume r = 0, Planner maximises steady state flow payoﬀs. People die at
rate φ ⇒ φ is entry rate.
Lets define λi the proportion of type i ∈ l, h who are active; i.e., U
A
i +Ei
ηi
. Clearly
if both types choose λi = 1 then the number of unemployed workers is same as
number of active unemployed workers in this economy. Consequently the propor-
tion of active workers who are low/high type is equal to the number of workers of
low/high type. Also if λi = 0 then πi = 0. 13
The objective function of the social planner is:
max
ηl,ηh,λl,λh,xl,xh,Ul,Uh,V
P = (ηl−Ul)xl+Ulb+(ηh−Uh)xh+Uhb−φ[ηlλlC(xl; al)+ηhλhC(xh; ah)]−kV
(2.21)
subject to three steady sate turnovers by the following equations:
(m(θ) + φ)UAi = δEi + φηiλi (2.22)
φ(Ui − UAi ) = φηi(1− λi) (2.23)
Ui + Ei = ηi (2.24)
13πi =
ηi[
Ei+U
A
i
Ei+Ui
]
ηl[
UA
l
+El
El+Ul]
+ηh[
UA
h
+Eh
Uh+Eh
]
.
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and also the market tightness condition:
θ =
V
UAl + U
A
h
(2.25)
The first steady state condition; (2.22) is that the flow of low/high ability active
unemployed worker out of unemployment equals the flow of low/high ability un-
employed worker back into active unemployment. Since m(θ) is the arrival rate of
vacancies and φ is arrival rate of new entrants, the flow of high/low ability unem-
ployed active workers out of unemployment is (m(θ) + φ)UAi . The corresponding
flow into active unemployment is δEi+φηiλi. The second steady sate condition is
that the flow of inactive workers out of unemployment equals the flow of inactive
workers into unemployment. There are η high/low ability workers, of whom 1− λ
are inactive. So the flow into inactive low/high ability unemployment would be
φηi(1−λi). Moreover total number of workers having high/low ability is η which is
sum of low/high employed and unemployed workers in third steady sate condition.
Substituting (2.23) and (2.24) into (2.22) gives,
UAi (φ+m(θ)) = δEi + φ(U
A
i + Ei) for i = l , h (2.26)
which implies that
UAi =
(φ+ δ)Ei
m(θ)
(2.27)
Lets define
λi =
Ei + UAi
ηi
(2.28)
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Substituting (2.27) into (2.28) and rearranging in terms of Ei gives,
Ei = λiηi
m(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
(2.29)
Substituting (2.29) into (2.21) the planner problem reduces to
max
xi,λi,θ
P = λlηlm(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
xl +
λhηhm(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
xh + [ηl − λlηlm(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
]b+ (2.30)
[ηh − λhηhm(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
]b− k θ(φ+ δ)
m(θ) + φ+ δ
(λlηl) + (λhηh)− φ[ηlλlC(xl; al)]− φ[ηhλhC(xh; ah)]
I can rewrite (2.31) function as:
max
xi,λi,θ
P = Σi=l,h
λiηim(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
xi + Σi=l,h[ηi − λiηim(θ)
φ+ δ +m(θ)
]b− (2.31)
k
θ(φ+ δ)
m(θ) + φ+ δ
Σi=l,h(λiηi)− Σi=l,hφ[ηiλiC(xi; ai)]
2.7 Appendix 2B
Social Planner Solution
Using the Lagrangian Method I can solve this standard optimisation problem as:
This problem satisfies the following first order conditions:
∂P
∂xi
=
∂C
∂xi
− m(θ)
φ(φ+ δ +m(θ))
= 0 (2.32)
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∂P
∂λi
= xi − b− φ(φ+ δ +m(θ)
m(θ)
C(xi; ai)− kθ(φ+ δ)
m(θ)
= 0 (2.33)
∂P
∂θ
= k− m
￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) [
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
xl+
λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
xh− b] = 0 (2.34)
Rearranging (2.32)
φηiλi = (m(θ) + φ)U
A
i − δ(ηiλi − UAi ) (2.35)
ηiλi = (
m(θ)
φ+ δ
+ 1)UAi (2.36)
2.8 Appendix 2C
Consider those individuals that are indiﬀerent to participate in labor market, from
the participation constraint lets substitute xi − b into above market and planner
free entry conditions then:
k =
m￿(θ)φ
m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ [πC(xl; al) + (1− π)C(xh; ah)]Plannersolution (2.37)
k =
(1− β)φ
βθ
[πC(xl; al) + (1− π)C(xh; ah)]Marketsolution (2.38)
when the worker is indiﬀerent to participate equality holds then (??) and (??) are
satisfied which implies
m￿(θ)φ
m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ =
(1− β)φ
βθ
then
m￿(θ)
m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ =
(1− β)
βθ
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dividing both sides by m(θ)
m￿
m(θ)
1− m￿θm(θ)
=
1− β
βm(θ)θm￿(θ)
rearranging the terms proves that Hosios Condition,i.e; 1− β = m￿(θ)θm(θ) satisfies.
2.9 Appendix 2D
Optimal Policies
(r + φ)VU(x, θ) = b− t+m(θ)[VE(x, θ)− VU(x, θ)] (2.39)
(r + φ)VE(x, θ) = w(x, θ) + δ[VU(x, θ)− VE(x, θ)] (2.40)
rJV (θ) = −k + m(θ)
θ
[π(JF (x
∗
l (θ))− JV (θ)) + (1− π)(JF (x∗h(θ))− JV (θ)] (2.41)
rJF (x, θ) = x− w(x, θ) + (δ + φ)[JV (θ)− JF (x, θ)] (2.42)
wN(x, θ) =
(r + φ+m(θ) + δ)xβ + (r + φ+ δ)(1− β)(b− t)
(βm(θ) + r + φ+ δ)
(2.43)
Vu(x, θ) =
(b− t)(r + φ+ δ) +m(θ)βx
(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))(r + φ)
(2.44)
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Investment Decision
C(xi; ai) = C(ai + ei; ai) = Cˆ(ei; ai)
where xi = ai + ei
The Planner Solution
∂C
∂x
=
m(θ)
φ(φ+ δ +m(θ))
The Market with policy Solution
(1− s)∂Cˆ
∂ei
=
βm(θ)
φ(φ+ δ + βm(θ))
Optimal Training Policy
if β = 1⇒ s∗ = 0
if β < 1⇒ s∗ = 1− β(φ+δ+m(θ)(φ+δ+βm(θ)) > 0
Participation Decision
VU(x, θ)− C(x; ai) > br+φ then participate
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The Planner Solution
If xi > b+
φ(φ+δ+m(θ)
m(θ) C(x
∗
i ) +
kθ(φ+δ)
m(θ) then participate
The Market with Policy Solution
If xi > b+
t(r+φ+δ)
m(θ)β +
(r+φ+δ+βm(θ))(r+φ)(1−s))
m(θ)β C(ei; ai) then participate
Optimal Participation fee
t∗ = kθβ + [φ(φ+ δ +m(θ))β − φβ(φ+ δ +m(θ))] 1
φ+ δ
if β = 1⇒ s∗ = 0⇒ t∗ = kθ
if β < 1⇒ s∗ = 1− β(φ+δ+m(θ)(φ+δ+βm(θ) >)0⇒ t∗ = βkθ
Free Entry Condition
The Planner Solution
k = m(θ)(1−β)θ(r+φ+δ+βm(θ)) [π(x
∗
l (θ)− b) + (1− π)(x∗h(θ)− b)]
The Market with Policy Solution
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k =
m(θ)
θ
1− β
r + φ+ δ + βm(θ)
[π(x∗l (θ) + b− t) + (1− π)(x∗h(θ) + b− t)] + z
Optimal Job Creation Subsidy
z∗ = (
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) −
m(θ)(1− β)
θ(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
)× (2.45)
[
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
(xl − b) + λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
(xh − b)]− t∗(m(θ)
θ
1− β
φ+ δ + βm(θ)
)
if β = 1 ⇒ s∗ = 0 ⇒ t∗ = kθ ⇒ z∗ = ( m￿(θ)(m(θ)+φ+δ−m￿(θ)θ))[ λlηlλlηl+λhηh (xl − b) +
λhηh
λlηl+λhηh
(xh − b)]
if β < 1⇒ s∗ = 1− β(φ+δ+m(θ)(φ+δ+βm(θ)) >)0⇒ t∗ = βkθ ⇒
z∗ =
￿
[
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) −
m(θ)(1− β)
θ(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
] (2.46)
×[ λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
(xl − b) + λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
(xh − b)]− t∗m(θ)
θ
1− β
φ+ δ + βm(θ)
￿
.
z∗ = (
m￿(θ)
(m(θ) + φ+ δ −m￿(θ)θ) −
m(θ)(1− β)
θ(r + φ+ δ + βm(θ))
)× (2.47)
[
λlηl
λlηl + λhηh
(xl − b) + λhηh
λlηl + λhηh
(xh − b)]− βkm(θ)(1− β)
φ+ δ + βm(θ)
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if β = 1 − m￿(θ)θm(θ) ⇒ s∗ = (m(θ)−m
￿(θ)θ)(φ+δ+m(θ))
m(θ)(φ+δ+βm(θ)) ⇒ t∗ = (kθ)(m(θ)−m
￿(θ)θ)
m(θ) ⇒ z∗ =
k(m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ)
m(θ)(φ+δ+m(θ)−m￿(θ)θ)
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Chapter 3
Optimal Social Security and Taxation with
Moral Hazard
3.1 Introduction
Social security systems are a common feature of all developed economies; they
are provided so as to uphold the standard of living of all citizens, regardless of
the causes of their poverty.1 While economists and policymakers are confronted
with challenging issues when faced with structuring and adjusting social security
systems, there are many concerns that arise with the system. In particular, how
it interacts with the economy or the labour market, the interactive eﬀect these
systems have on the searcher behaviour to accept the jobs, how it can be ad-
justed to discourage greater unemployment and more importantly how it can be
implemented to induce optimal search by job seekers, are indisputable.
1Research suggests that they [unemployment benefit schemes] reduce the aggregate poverty
rate by almost one percentage point, Moﬃtt (2014).
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This paper, motivated by these concerns, develops an integrated framework
where social security benefits are chosen to induce optimal search by unemployed
workers GIVEN the income tax structure imposed by government. Here workers
are risk neutral and the tax structure reallocates income from the rich to the
poor. Generally, tax policy distorts the willingness of workers to find employment.
However, here the novelty is that optimal benefit program is co-ordinated with
optimal tax policy.
The planner does not observe job oﬀers and the planner objective here is to
maximise an unemployed worker welfare and is allowed three policy variables; (i) a
constant social security benefit b, (ii) a marginal income tax τ and (iii) a break-even
income level w0, where those instruments must satisfy the incentive compatibil-
ity of unemployed worker that the worker adapts reservation wage strategy and
contribution constraint.
Several points arise. The eﬀects of the marginal tax rate on the reservation
wage of unemployed worker depend on the social security benefit and the break-
even income threshold. When the break even level of income is higher than the
sum of social security benefit and the opportunity cost of employment, an increase
in marginal tax rate makes workers less selective during search and decreases the
reservation wage. A lower reservation wage increases the probability of a worker
accepting a job. Conversely, when this sum is higher than the break even level,
unemployment becomes more attractive compared to employment. The reservation
wage also rises. The reservation wage change, the critical response of these results,
reflects the workersttitude towards unemployment. The imposition of break even
income on the worker reservation wage has more definitive eﬀects. It reduces
reservation wage of the worker. Clearly the workers respond by adjusting the
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reservation wage.
Given the underlying policy trade-oﬀ is between social security benefits, marginal
income tax and break even income level, all policies play an important role. In
the expansive literature on optimal benefits, government tax policy on employed
worker wage has been ignored. An important feature of the analysis is that the
tax system is related to two stands of planner choices. The first consists of the
amount of redistribution one wishes to make across the worker population and the
second is related to amount of tax income needs to finance government spending.
I bring these two strands in the given tax structure. There is double infinity of
eﬃcient tax policies.
Much interest has recently been shown in studying the responsiveness of un-
employment or unemployment duration to unemployment benefits. Some work
in this area has centred on the responsiveness of reservation wages to benefits,
Fishe (1982), Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Shimer and Werning (2006). Fishe
(1982) and Feldstein and Poterba (1984) find that one dollar increase in benefits
may raise pretax reservation wage by as much as 0.44 dollar. While Feldstein and
Poterba (1984) argue this as the evidence of the moral hazard cost of increasing
unemployment benefits. While this evidence (moral hazard problem) is close in
spirit to the one I adopt here, I first assume the planner observes each worker type
and then suggests a practical tax policy in the case when workers type is private
information.
Reducing inequality is an important aspect of economic analysis. Most economists
assume that equity and eﬃciency cannot be achieved together- redistributive trans-
fers increase equity but make a loss in eﬃciency-the so-called leaky bucket, Okun
(1970). He asserts that any dollar transferred from a richer individual to a poorer
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individual, will result in less than a dollar increase in income for the recipient.
According to the substantial empirical evidence, government transfers designed to
create greater equity can lead to ineﬃciencies. For instance, to test the eﬀects
of welfare program design on labor supply and well-being of recipients (negative
income tax experiments, Burtless(1986)) in 1970s the US funded a series of ex-
periments.While Okuns leaky bucket is a reality for many transfers programs, in
a number of real world policy situations, equity and eﬃciency are not inevitably
in conflict with each other, Blank (2002). This paper interestingly, unlike actual
social security benefit programs, proves that all should receive the same benefit
level based on the equity issue.
Following Diamond/Mirrlees there is a large optimal tax policy literature which
considers asymmetric information on worker type. As that literature assumes that
the planner knows the distribution of workers type across the entire population,
however, the worker’s type is unknown information to the planner. The optimal
tax policy reduces to a mechanism design problem with truth telling constraint
in that framework. Also they set out the problem of using taxation and govern-
ment production to maximise a social welfare function. They show the optimal
redistribution- by using subsidising and taxing diﬀerent goods to alter individual
real incomes- occurs when there is a balance between the equity improvements and
the eﬃciency losses from further taxation.
As mentioned earlier, this paper first assumes the planner observes worker’s
type and then instead assumes there is asymmetric information where the worker’s
type is private information plus the planner does not know the distribution of
workers types. An important feature of optimal social security benefit policy,
given tax parameters, is that it is completely independent of worker’s type which
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implies it is a flat rate paid to all. Clearly this is very diﬀerent to standard social
security benefit schemes where benefits paid are frequently positively related to
previous earning.2
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents
the model that includes how risk neutral workers behave when confronted with
constant social security benefit and given tax system. Then I describe the problem
of the government in choosing the optimal level of social security benefit subject to
incentive compatibility constraint and the contribution constraint. In section (3)
I analyse a practical policy application. In section (4) I discuss some important
caveats, in section (5) I discuss about available evidence of UK welfare economy
focusing on universal tax credit and I conclude in section (6).
3.2 The Model
Time is continuous and has an infinite horizon. Workers are risk neutral, have
the same discount rate r > 0, are initially unemployed and have the same home
productivity d ≥ 0. Unemployed workers search sequentially for employment with
random search. Workers are ex-ante heterogenous in that they face diﬀer job
search opportunities: each is described by θ = (α, F (.)) where
(i) α describes the rate the unemployed worker receives job oﬀers, and
(ii) conditional on a job oﬀer, the wage oﬀered is a random draw from F (.)
2World’s best places for unemployment pay such as Norway where unemployed receive 87.6
percent of their previous salaries for five hundred days and in Finland they receive 85.1 percent
of their previous salaries for one year. In Sweden, Israel, Japan and Germany, the unemployed
can claim benefits worth between 66 percent and 90 percent of their last salaries.
This information obtained on 15/07/20015 from the following web site:
http : //www.forbes.com/2008/06/27/unemployment − benefits − world − forbeslife −
cxmw0627worldunemployment.html
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with support denoted [w,w].
For the moment I assume the Planner observes each worker’s type θ but relax this
assumption later.
While a worker is unemployed, he/she receives social security benefit b (which
is assumed duration independent) and chooses an optimal job search strategy to
maximise expected discounted lifetime earnings. The Planner does not observe job
oﬀers. Thus should the worker reject a job oﬀer, he/she remains unemployed and
continues to receive benefit b (with no recall of oﬀers). This generates a standard
moral hazard problem.
If the worker accepts job oﬀer w then, for simplicity, I assume the job is for
life. There is no on-the-job search. Once employed on wage w, the worker faces a
linear tax code with marginal income tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1). Take home pay is then
w0 + (1− τ)[w − w0] where w0 is referred to as the break even income threshold;
i.e. if employed on wage w < w0, the worker is a net benefit receiver from the
government, while instead earning wage w > w0 implies a net tax payer. As θ is
observed, at this stage I allow these tax parameters to be type specific.
As workers are risk neutral, there is no loss in generality by assuming workers
have no savings (i.e. they simply consume all savings at date t = 0 and then
proceed optimally). In the absence of any insurance motive, the tax system here
is a purely redistributive scheme which requires that each worker θ contributes
some amount Cθ to the public purse, where contributions Cθ may vary across
types (e.g. high earning types may be required to make a bigger contribution).
The novelty here is that the optimal benefit program is co-ordinated with optimal
tax policy; i.e. for each θ, the Planner chooses a type specific policy (b, τ, w0) to
maximise worker welfare, subject to the moral hazard problem that job oﬀers are
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Figure 3.1: Workers Post-Tax Earnings
not observed and that worker θ must, in expectation, contribute Cθ to the public
purse. Theorem 1 below describes that optimal policy. To establish the result, I
first describe worker θ￿s optimal job search strategy given tax parameters (b, τ, w0).
3.2.1 Worker Behaviour
As the worker’s type θ is fixed in this section, for ease of notation I drop reference
to θ. As a job is for life and there is no on-the-job search, becoming employed at
wage w with tax code (τ, w0) implies worker lifetime value:
V e(w) =
w0 + (1− τ)[w − w0]
r
. (3.1)
While unemployed and with random search, the value of being unemployed, de-
noted V u, satisfies the standard Bellman equation
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rV u = b+ d+ α
￿ w
w
max [V e(w)− V u, 0] dF (w). (3.2)
At rate α the worker receives a job oﬀer which either yields capital gain V e(w)− V u ≥ 0
(and the worker accepts the job), otherwise the worker rejects the job oﬀer (and
remains unemployed). Substituting out V e(w) using (3.1) in (3.2) gives
rV u = b+ d+ α
￿ w
w
max
￿
w0 + (1− τ)[w − w0]
r
− V u, 0
￿
dF (w). (3.3)
As τ < 1 implies V e(w) is increasing in wage w, the worker’s optimal job search
strategy has the reservation wage property3: the worker accepts any job oﬀer
w ≥ R where
w0 + (1− τ)[R− w0]
r
= V u. (3.4)
Using (3.4) to substitute out V u in the Bellman equation above and simplifying
yields the reservation wage equation:
R =
b+ d− τw0
1− τ +
α
r
￿ w
R
[w −R] dF (w). (3.5)
(3.5) determines the worker’s reservation wage R = R(b, w0, τ) as a function of
the government’s tax parameters (b, w0, τ) (and also the worker’s type θ). Claim
1 shows how the policy parameters (b, w0, τ) distort job search incentives.
3for w < R implies V e(w) < V u and so w will be rejected, and w > R implies V e(w) > V u
and so w should be accepted.
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CLAIM 1. For τ ∈ (0, 1), the reservation wage R(.) implies
∂R
∂b
=
1
(1− τ)[1 + a(1−F (R))r ]
> 0; (3.6)
∂R
∂τ
=
b+ d− w0
(1− τ)2[1 + a(1−F (R))r ]
(3.7)
∂R
∂w0
=
−τ
(1− τ)[1 + a(1−F (R))r ]
< 0 (3.8)
As is standard an increase in b increases the worker’s reservation wage R. An
increase in the break even level of income w0 instead decreases the reservation
wage. This occurs for an increase in w0 increases the worker’s take-home pay at
every wage which, by increasing the return to taking a job oﬀer, decreases the
worker’s reservation wage. The impact of an increase in the marginal tax rate τ,
however, is ambiguous. If the break even level of income is low, w0 < b + d, then
an increase in the marginal tax rate increases the worker’s reservation wage; the
worker substitutes into unemployment. But the converse holds if w0 > b+d, in that
case an increase in the marginal tax rate yields the counterintuitive result that the
worker’s reservation wage decreases and the worker substitutes into employment.
3.2.2 The Planner Problem
By assumption the worker’s type θ is observed, the worker is initially unemployed
and the Planner requires this worker to pay expected discounted tax Cθ. Given
policy parameters (b, w0, τ) and the worker’s type θ, the worker adopts reserva-
tion wage strategy R = R(b, w0, τ) as described by (3.5). The worker’s expected
discounted contribution to the public purse, C0, is then identified recursively by
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rC0 = −b+ α
￿ w
R
￿
τ(w − w0)
r
− C0
￿
dF (w), (3.9)
where R = R(b, w0, τ). While unemployed the worker receives b from the gov-
ernment. Given reservation wage R, the worker exits unemployment at rate
α[1 − F (R)] and thereafter pays tax on future realised earnings w. Of course
conditional on taking a job w ≥ R, the wage earned is a random draw from the
wage distribution F (.) truncated at R, and
￿
τ(w−w0)
r − C0
￿
is the corresponding
capital gain in tax receipts enjoyed by the government when the worker accepts
a job oﬀer. Rewriting for C0, noting that worker θ’s lifetime tax contribution C0
must equal Cθ, the Planner’s tax policy (b, w0, τ) must satisfy the contribution
constraint:
−b+ αr
￿ w
R τ(w − w0)dF (w)
1 + αr [1− F (R)]
= rCθ, (3.10)
with R = R(b, w0, τ). The government’s policy is thus to choose (b, τ, w0) to max-
imise V u, the expected lifetime utility of the initially unemployed worker subject
to (i) incentive compatibility - that the worker adopts reservation wage strategy
R = R(.) and (ii) the contribution constraint - that the policy generates net contri-
bution Cθ. Noting V u is given by (3.4), the Planner’s problem is formally defined
as follows.
Definition of the Planner’s Problem:
max
b,τ,w0,R
τw0 + (1− τ)R
r
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subject to
(i) incentive compatibility - that R = R(b, τ, w0) is the solution to (3.5), and
(ii) contribution constraint - that (3.10) is satisfied.
Fortunately there is an elegant way to solve this policy problem. The first step is
to solve for the optimal level of b using a policy perturbation argument. Suppose a
policy optimum exists, denoted (b∗, τ ∗, w∗0) , where the worker adopts correspond-
ing reservation wage R = R∗. Consider a policy perturbation where the Planner
chooses b = b∗ + db where db ￿= 0 but small. Suppose the Planner in addition
chooses policy variations (dτ, dw0) so that the worker’s reservation wage is un-
changed; i.e. dR = 0, and the worker’s contribution C0 is also unchanged. As
such a policy variation remains incentive compatible and meets the contribution
constraint, a necessary condition for optimality is it does not increase Vu.
To hold R constant, a first order Taylor expansion on (3.5) implies (db, dτ, dw0)
must satisfy
dR =
1
1− τ db−
τ
1− τ dw0 +
b+ d− w0
(1− τ)2 dτ = 0. (3.11)
Hence the constraint dR = 0 requires (dw0, dτ) satisfy:
τdw0 − b+ d− w0
(1− τ) dτ = db. (3.12)
As a policy perturbation satisfying (3.12) ensures dR = 0, equation (3.10) and
the constraint dC0 = 0 additionally requires (db, dτ, dw0) satisfy
−db+
￿
α
r
￿ w
R
(w − w0)dF (w)
￿
dτ − α
r
τ [1− F (R)]dw0 = 0
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which I rearrange as:
￿
α
r
￿ w
R
(w − w0)dF (w)
￿
dτ − α
r
τ [1− F (R)]dw0 = db (3.13)
Thus for db ￿= 0, (3.12) and (3.13) imply dR = dC0 = 0 if and only if (dw0, dτ)
satisfy:
 τ − b+d−w0(1−τ)
−αr τ [1− F (R)] αr
￿ w
R (w − w0)dF (w)

 dw0
dτ
 =
 1
1
 db.
Let ∆ = ατr
￿￿ w
R (w − w0)dF (w)− [1− F (R)] b+d−w0(1−τ)
￿
. Then as long as ∆ ￿= 0,
perturbation (db, dτ, dw0) holds dR = dC0 = 0 if and only if: dw0
dτ
 =

α
r
￿ w
R (w−w0)dF (w)+
b+d−w0
(1−τ)
∆
τ [1+αr [1−F (R)]]
∆
 db.
Consider then the first order impact of this policy perturbation on the objective
function; i.e
rdVu = [w0 −R]dτ + τdw0.
Substituting out (dτ, dw0) using the above implies:
rdVu =
￿
[w0 −R]τ [1 +
α
r [1− F (R)]]
∆
+ τ
α
r
￿ w
R (w − w0)dF (w) + b+d−w0(1−τ)
∆
￿
db.
The necessary condition for optimality is dVu/db = 0, otherwise a policy variation
with db ￿= 0 exists which strictly increases welfare and satisfies the constraints.
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Hence a necessary condition for optimality is
￿
[w0 −R][1 + α
r
[1− F (R)]] + α
r
￿ w
R
(w − w0)dF (w) + b+ d− w0
(1− τ)
￿
= 0.
Rewriting this equation for b and simplifying yields Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. In the Planner’s problem, optimal b satisfies
b = τw0 − d+ (1− τ)R− α(1− τ)
r
￿ w
R
[w −R] dF (w). (3.14)
The interpretation for optimal b in Lemma 1 is complex for it applies for ar-
bitrary tax parameters (τ, w0). The structure of the optimal policy will become
transparent once optimal (τ, w0) are also determined.
Given Lemma 1, I now use (3.14) to substitute out optimal b in the Planner’s
problem and so reduce the dimensionality of the programming problem. This
generates, however, a curious property: equation (3.14) describing the optimal
choice of b is equivalent to the worker’s reservation wage equation (3.5) determining
R = R(b, τ, w0). The insight for what follows is that the incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding at the policy optimum.
Substituting out b using (3.14) in the optimal program, the Planner’s problem
formally reduces to
max
τ,w0,R
τw0 + (1− τ)R (3.15)
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subject to the contribution constraint
−
￿
τw0 − d+ (1− τ)R− α(1−τ)r
￿ w
R [w −R] dF (w)
￿
+ αr τ
￿ w
R (w − w0)dF (w)
[1 + αr [1− F (R)]]
= rCθ.
(3.16)
where optimal b given by (3.14) ensures the worker adopts the optimal reservation
wage R∗; i.e. (3.14) ensures the incentive compatibility constraint is automatically
satisfied.
I solve this latter problem by substituting out the constraint (3.16). Rewriting
(3.16) for w0 and simplifying yields
w0 =
−[r + α[1− F (R)]]Cθ + d− (1− τ)R + αr τ
￿ w
R wdF (w) +
α(1−τ)
r
￿ w
R [w −R] dF (w)
τ [1 + αr [1− F (R)]]
.
(3.17)
Substituting out w0 in the objective function and simplifying finds the Planner’s
problem reduces to
max
τ,R
[−rCθ + d+
α
r
￿ w
R wdF (w)
[1 + αr [1− F (R)]]
]. (3.18)
As the objective function does not depend on τ, the optimal choice of τ is not
uniquely determined. The necessary condition for optimal R implies (3.21) below
and so I identify the following optimal policy.
THEOREM 1. For any θ and contribution Cθ, the optimal policy (b,τ, w0)
is not uniquely determined. For any τ ∈ (0, 1), the Planner sets social security
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benefit
b = τ(w0 − d), (3.19)
with w0 given by
w0 = R
∗ − rCθ
τ
. (3.20)
where the worker’s reservation wage R∗ solves
R∗ = d+
α
r
￿ w
R∗
[w −R∗]dF (w). (3.21)
Proof. (3.21) was established in the text. As (3.14) describes optimal b, then
using (3.21) to substitute out R = R∗ in (3.14) yields (3.19). Using (3.21) to
simplify (3.17) implies (3.20) satisfies the contribution constraint. This completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
Note that (3.21) implies the optimal reservation wage R∗ is consistent with
worker θ receiving his/her opportunity cost of employment d while searching and
enjoying the full return to job search (i.e. with no taxation on earnings). Given
the Planner has three policy instruments (b, τ, w0) and only two restrictions, (i)
to implement reservation wage R∗ and (ii) satisfy budget balance (3.10), it is
not then surprising that there is a degree of freedom in the optimal tax policy.
Conditional on any choice τ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal break-even threshold w0 depends
on the worker’s reservation wage and the required contribution Cθ: the larger the
required contribution the lower the break-even threshold. What is remarkable,
however, is that conditional on the marginal tax rate τ and break-even threshold
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w0, the optimal social security benefit policy b is independent of the worker’s type
θ. I now argue how Theorem 2 suggests a very simple and practical tax policy in
the case when θ is private information.
3.3 A Practical Policy Application
The previous section made some very strong, though standard assumptions, namely
(i) each person’s type θ = (α, F (.)) is observed, and (ii) the Planner decides ex-
ante how much contribution Cθ each individual θ should contribute to the public
purse. Neither assumption is particularly palatable. Following seminal work by
Diamond/Mirrlees, there is a large literature on optimal tax policy when there
is asymmetric information on worker type θ. But an unappealing assumption in
that approach is that although the Planner does not know the worker’s type θ,
he/she knows the distribution across the entire population. With that assump-
tion, optimal tax policy reduces to a mechanism design problem with truth telling
constraints. Unfortunately that approach rarely provides practical implications
for optimal tax policy.
Suppose in the above framework that there is not only the moral hazard prob-
lem described above, but there is asymmetric information: the worker’s type θ
is private information. Furthermore suppose the government does not know the
distribution of types G(θ). How then can the government design an eﬃcient tax
structure? Theorem 2 provides the answer.
Consider a universal tax scheme, such as pay as you earn in the UK (PAYE)
whereby individuals who earn wage w must pay tax T (w) to the government, where
the tax schedule T (.) is the same for all. Suppose further the government chooses
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a linear PAYE scheme with tax parameters (τ, w0). On the assumption that the
government observes (or can measure) home productivity d, Theorem 2 implies
the following eﬃcient tax and benefit policy.
THEOREM 2. Given any linear, universal tax scheme (τ, w0) with τ ∈ (0, 1)
then the tax policy is eﬃcient if and only if social security benefit b = τ(w0 − d).
Proof follows directly from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 turns Theorem 1 on its head. Rather than identifying the optimal
tax and benefit policies given an exogenous distribution of contributions Cθ, The-
orem 2 instead identifies the unique optimal unemployment benefit policy given
(exogenous) tax parameters (τ, w0). The assumption that θ is private informa-
tion plays no important role for the optimal benefit paid is independent of θ; i.e.
optimal social security benefits b is a flat rate paid to all.
Unlike actual social security benefit programs, Theorem 2 implies (with linear,
universal tax schemes) that all should receive the same benefit level. This policy
prescription is very diﬀerent to standard unemployment benefit schemes where
benefits paid are frequently positively related to (previous) earnings. Of course an
important distinction here is that I am considering an equity issue - the eﬃcient
transfer of resources from the well paid to the poorly paid. As the tax policy
transfers resources from the well paid to the less well paid while employed, why
should it be optimal to pay higher social security benefits to the (previously) highly
paid? Theorem 2 establishes benefits should be paid at a flat rate.
There is a double-infinity of eﬃcient tax policies. The choice of tax parameters
(τ, w0) depends on (i) how much redistribution the Planner wishes to make across
the worker population and (ii) how much tax needs to be collected to finance
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government spending.
For example a Laissez-faire policy which sets τ = 0 (and then eﬃcient b = 0)
implies zero redistribution across workers. Conversely letting τ → 1 implies perfect
redistribution where, in this limit, all employed workers enjoy the same after-tax
wage w0 and eﬃcient b→ w0−d. Away from these two extremes, inverting equation
(3.20) implies the expected contribution of worker type θ to the public purse is
Cθ =
τ (R∗ − w0)
r
where R∗ is given by (3.21). As high skilled workers (high α and high wage oﬀers)
have high reservation wage R∗, the tax program ensures they contribute more to
the public purse than do workers with low reservation wages. Indeed workers with
R∗ > w0 are net contributors to the public purse and contribute more as the tax
rate τ increases, while less skilled workers with R∗ < w0 are net benefit receivers
who receive more the greater the marginal tax rate. Furthermore increasing the
marginal tax rate τ increases linearly the transfer of resources from high R∗ > w
workers to low R∗ < w0 workers.
The choice of w0 determines gross tax revenues, where decreasing w0 implies
all contribute more to the public purse and tax revenues increase. For example
if the government needs to reduce the deficit by raising taxes, it does not do
this by increasing the marginal tax rate but by reducing the break-even income
threshold. Of course such a policy change hits all individuals equally - each person’s
contribution to the public purse increases by [τ/r][−dw0]. If this is deemed too
regressive, the Planner can additionally increase τ so that the well paid pay more
and the poor pay less. In this way, the government can use tax policy to separately
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address income inequality and the need to balance its budget while b satisfying
(3.19) ensures eﬃcient job search.
3.4 Some Important Caveats
There are many possible extensions for this approach. For example suppose there
is layoﬀ risk: that at rate δ the worker is laid-oﬀ and becomes unemployed. For the
case that workers are risk neutral, it is obvious that the analysis goes through: with
no requirement that a worker θ must contribute some ex-ante amount Cθ to the
public purse, there is a double infinity of optimal linear tax schemes (w0, τ) where
the choice of social security benefit paid ensures the unemployed worker adopts the
optimal job search strategy R∗. Similarly if there is exogenous on-the-job search.
Whether the optimal social security benefit remains a flat rate, however, is not
immediately obvious.
The approach ignores ex-ante investment in education by workers: it simply
assumes workers are born with search options (α, F (.)) while, in truth, young
people invest in education so as to improve those opportunities. With a linear tax
scheme and optimal benefits, (3.4) implies the initially unemployed worker enjoy
value
V u =
w0 + (1− τ)[R∗ − w0]
r
. (3.22)
This identifies the fundamental trade-oﬀ for the government. Investing in educa-
tion, presumably, improves job search opportunities: job oﬀer rates α improve and
the wage oﬀer distribution F (.) is more favourable. In this framework, changes
in R∗ is the appropriate metric for measuring the return to education. Although
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raising the marginal tax rate τ reduces inequality, the cost is it reduces investment
incentives - a well-known trade-oﬀ.
The approach also does not consider equilibrium wage formation and, in par-
ticular, does not consider how changing the tax program aﬀects wage outcomes.
This is an important omission. For example, in the extreme case of τ = 1, there
is no purpose to a firm paying a wage greater than w0 as the government fully
taxes that wage premium. Indeed the optimal policy of the firm is to set wage
w = 0 as the employed worker then receives w0 in benefits from the government.
Clearly such an economic outcome would not be sustainable. An important issue
for the government is to assess by how much an increase in the marginal tax rate
τ depresses wage oﬀers by firms? This is an empirical question which goes far
beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally the paper does not consider equilibrium job creation and endogenous
job search eﬀort and thus the equilibrium arrival rate of job oﬀers α. Clearly
charging a positive marginal tax rate τ and a positive break-even income level w0
extracts rents from high skill workers and passes them to low skill workers. One
should expect that such a transfer of employment rents depresses job creation in
the high skill sector and increases job creation in the low skill sector. Again this
is an interesting theoretical question which I leave to future research.
3.5 Universal Tax Credit
A prevalent approach to social security benefits is to target welfare payments to
individuals or households whose income falls below a certain level. If a claimant’s
circumstances change so that he/she earns more, whether by working more hours
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or by finding better paid employment, the worker will lose their entitlement to
some if not all of their income-related benefits. When a country’s tax structure is
not properly co-ordinated with its social security benefit schemes, poverty traps
arise should benefits paid be withdrawn too quickly as earnings increase. Such
benefit withdrawals can sometimes generate a 100% marginal tax rate and, with
no (or little) financial gain to taking work, unemployed workers have little incentive
to find employment. Or put diﬀerently, they hold reservation wages which are too
high relative to their job opportunities.
An interesting feature of recent tax policy in the UK is the move to universal tax
credits. This new tax structure aims to properly co-ordinate benefit claims with in-
come tax payments by replacing six means-tested working age benefits [Jobseekers
Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Housing Ben-
efit, Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit] into a single tax credit/payment
should their income fall below a particular income threshold. The purpose is not
only to simplify the benefits system and co-ordinate it properly with income tax-
ation, but also to remove poverty traps and so provide incentives for poorly paid
workers to find employment and reduce in-work poverty. Curiously the intended
marginal tax rate is still very high at 65%; i.e. additional earnings reduce UC by
65%.
The marginal eﬀective tax rate (METR) is the percentage of an extra unit of
income that the claimant loses due to income taxes, National Insurance Contri-
butions (NICs), etc.4 Therefore, the taper rate of 65% under UC forms the base
of the METR; a claimant liable for National Insurance and paying income tax (at
the main rate of 20 percent) who earns an additional pound will not only lose 65p
4It the income withdrawn through the tax and benefit system.
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of UC but will have to pay an additional 20p in income tax as well as 12p in NICS;
creating a METR of 76.2 percent. This demonstrates the substantial eﬀect the
METR can have on disposable income and work incentives provided to claimants.
Around 4 million workers will see a change in their METR, the most significant of
these changes are seen in five major groups.5,6
The paper considered here speaks directly to such a tax system but in the case
that all face the same marginal tax rate. In such a tax environment, ensuring the
unemployed have optimal job search incentives requires all receive the same, flat
level of social security benefit.
5The most eﬀective way to comprehensively appraise a tax system and how it aﬀects work
incentives is to evaluate the tax rate schedule through the calculation of the marginal eﬀective
tax rate and the participation tax rate. These tax rates will principally be analysed with the
aid of Brewer, Browne and Jin (2011) research and an impact assessment carried out by the
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP).
6The marginal eﬀective tax rate (METR) is essential to providing strong incentives to enter
employment; Council tax support could sabotage these work incentives. After the 65 percent
withdrawal of benefits has been applied to net income, around 20 percent of the remainder
may then be withdrawn through CTS. Therefore, claimants who pay NICs and tax, facing both
withdrawal of UC and council tax rebate could be facing tremendous METRs. Pennycook, M. and
Hurrell, A. (2013) “No Clear Benefit: The financial impact of Council Tax Benefit reform on low
income households”, estimate marginal deduction rates (MDRs) of over 80 percent; they mention
that once Council Tax support has been included, the MDRs of most households receiving both
UC and Council Tax support (around 620,000 CTB claimants or 9 in 10 of every current claimant
in employment) will rise to around 81 per cent. Accordingly, claimants would lose as much as 81
pence of each additional pound they earn through taxes and withdrawn benefits, obviously dis-
incentivising work and creating extreme diﬃculties for claimants to escape poverty; the poverty
trap. he Public Accounts Committee found that for up to 225,000 people, the replacement of
CTB has meant a weakening of work incentives, and marginal rates of up to 97 per cent.Finch,
Corlett and Alakeson (2014), Universal Credit: A policy under review. London: Resolution
Foundation p.22) Moreover, due to the authority granted to local councils, CTS schemes could
easily raise withdrawal rates, giving rise to METRs such as 97 percent, exacerbating the negative
eﬀects.
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3.6 Conclusion
Despite extensive attention in the economics literature to the optimal unemploy-
ment benefits, there has been little attention focused on social security benefit
to induce optimal search by unemployed workers given the income tax structure
imposed by the government.
In the case of risk neutral workers but with moral hazard and hidden informa-
tion on the worker’s type, this paper has identified a simple rule which identifies
the link between optimal social security benefits paid and the tax system. Specif-
ically in the case of a universal, linear income tax scheme, I have shown optimal
social security benefits should be paid at a flat rate; i.e. all receive the same benefit
level regardless of (expected future) earnings.
Although this benefit policy generates eﬃcient search incentives and thus opti-
mal re-employment rates, the analysis has not considered how high tax rates will
generate other ineﬃciencies in the economy, such as low education investments by
workers and reduced job creation by firms.
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